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I. Introduction
A 2018 Report for the European Parliament’s Committee on
International Trade concluded:
Corruption perception indexes [show] that in most of the
world corruption is the rule rather than the exception. The report
finds evidence that international trade agreements have the
potential to act as the exogenous factor breaking the vicious circle
of corruption in economies based on privileged connections rather
than fair competition.…1
The European Commission reported that corruption costs the EU at
least €120bn per annum—almost as much as the EU’s annual budget, and a
1. Alina Mungui-Pippidi, Anti-Corruption Provisions in EU Free Trade and Investment
Agreements: Delivering on Clean, EUR. PARL. DOC. 10.2861/203713 at 5 (Apr. 2018),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/603867/EXPO_STU(2018)603
867_EN.pdf (“They increase competition in the removal of tariffs and so diminish the power
of rentier companies which influence domestic regulation in their favor. They also contribute
to a fairer business environment through their transparency provisions.”). See also Alina
Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, EUR. RES. CTR.
FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION AND STATE-BUILDING (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.againstcorrup
tion.eu/events/anti-corruption-provisions-in-eu-free-trade-and-investment-agreements-deliv
ering-on-clean-trade/ (The options offered are between good governance package, a firm
anticorruption language but unenforceable provisions even in EU countries.).
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2016 study commissioned by the European Parliament found the cost of
corruption across every EU member state could actually be as high as €990
billion—eight times higher than previous estimates.2
Clearly, corruption hurts competition, raises prices, negates fair trade,
and has social consequences;3 it is one of the most pervasive and financially
damaging crimes in the world, costing the global economy an estimated $2.6
trillion every year, or 5 percent of the world’s gross domestic product.4
In China, a 2018 report concludes a partial accounting of corruption
showed Chinese-listed firms suffered an aggregate loss of USD $30 billion
in firm value due to corruption.5 Chinese President Xi Jinping has called
“corruption, the ruling Communist Party’s biggest threat and vowed a
‘sweeping victory ’over the problem.”6
The widespread corruption involved in Chinese (often state-owned)
companies ’overseas activities has become a growing international problem.
In the latest BPI [Business Performance Indicator], China ranked 27 out of

2. Ruth Green, Fighting Corruption Remains a Low Priority for the EU, INT’L BAR
ASS’N (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=8ab99
96b-5454-4a7d-a38a-6e376aa310f3. See generally Costs of Corruption Across the EU, THE
GREENS/EFA IN THE EUR. PARL. (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.greens-efa.eu/files/doc/docs/e
46449daadbfebc325a0b408bbf5ab1d.pdf. (“At a national level, the damage done by
corruption to the GDP of EU Member States ranges from 15% in Romania (€38.6 billion) to
0.76% in the Netherlands (still adding up however to over €4.4 billion). Italy breaks the record
in absolute terms, losing €236.8 billion each year to corruption. France comes second, losing
€120.2 billion each year to corruption, whilst Germany takes a hit to GDP of over €104 billion
every single year.”). Of course, all bribery does not involve cross-border transactions; rather
it is a reminder of the pervasiveness of corruption.
3. Elvin Mirzayev, How Corruption Affects Emerging Economies, INVESTOPEDIA (May
19, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/012215/how-corruption-affectsemerging-economies.asp.
4. U.N. Security Council, Global Cost of Corruption at Least 5 Per Cent of World Gross
Domestic Product, Secretary-General Tells Security Council, Citing World Economic Forum
Data (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13493.doc.htm.
5. Daniel S. Kim, Yun Li & Domenico Tarzia, Value of Corruption in China: Evidence
from Anti-Corruption Investigation, ELSEVIER: ECON. LETTERS (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176518300296?via%3Dihub; https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.econlet.2018.01.021. See also China Corruption Rank, TRADING ECON., https://
tradingeconomics.com/china/corruption-rank (China is the 87th least corrupt nation out of
175 countries, according to the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index.). Ralph Jennings, Bad for
Business? China’s Corruption Isn’t Getting Any Better Despite Government Crackdown,
FORBES (Mar. 15, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2018/03/
15/corruption-in-china-gets-stuck-half-way-between-the-worlds-best-and-worst/#720e34c6
73d1 (Some experts observe, foreign companies prefer to operate in China’s 14 special trade
zones “because they’re relatively free of corruption.”).
6. Jennings, Bad for Business? China’s Corruption Isn’t Getting Any Better Despite
Government Crackdown, supra note 5.
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28 major global economies, with only Russian companies being even more
likely to pay bribes abroad.7
On the global level, in the last two decades Regional Free Trade
Agreements (RTAs) have attempted to curb corruption through treaty
provisions. … corruption was identified as a major hindrance to free trade
and a vast enterprise was begun to build a legal framework against
international anticorruption. Its target is both national corruption––abuse of
authority for private benefit, as it is defined by most international
organizations––and international corruption, focusing in particular on
transnational bribery.8 … That then led to the common tendency of modern
RTAs to address regulatory areas such as transparency and anticorruption
provisions alongside environmental and labor standards with more than 40
per cent of RTAs concluded since the millennium incorporating
anticorruption and anti-bribery commitments, which have no precedent
under the WTO regime.9
This paper discusses the domestic and international standards and
regulation of corruption and assesses whether an EU-China FTA with
anticorruption and transparency provisions on trade and investment can
facilitate a diminishing of the corruption. Specifically, it examines the
anticorruption standards at the international level (OECD; UN; WTO; EU’s
GRECO), and at the domestic level with China, EU, and selected EU
member states, with some reference to the FCPA of the U.S. Issues include
how corruption is defined, whether private and public persons are covered,
whether there is an extra-territorial reach of domestic laws, what is the
administrative enforcement, what are the penalties: civil and/or criminal, and
what is the effectiveness of such regulatory measures? It will then compare

7. Bertram Lang, China and Global Integrity-Building: Challenges and Prospects for
Engagement, U4 ANTI-CORRUPTION RESOURCE CTR. at 3 (2019), https://www.u4.no/publi
cations/china-and-global-integrity-building-challenges-and-prospects-for-engagement.pdf.
See also Nieves Zúñiga, China: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Apr. 10, 2018), https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads
/helpdesk/Country-profile-China-2018.pdf (“According to a survey conducted by Charney
Research in 2015, 35 per cent of companies in China confirmed that they had to pay bribes or
give gifts to officials to operate … [and] corruption at the border in China is one of the most
problematic factors for importers …. Respondents to the Executive Opinion Survey 2017
(World Economic Forum 2017) situate corruption as the fourth most problematic factor for
doing business in China after access to financing, inefficient government bureaucracy,
inflation and policy instability.”).
8. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1.
9. Id. at 16-17. See also Matthew Jenkins, Anti-Corruption and Transparency Provisions in
Trade Agreements, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.transparency.org/
files/content/corruptionqas/Anti-corruption_and_transparency_provisions_in_trade_agreem
ents_2017.pdf.
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and assess how EU-China FTA provisions could enhance the enforcement
of anticorruption regulation where domestic laws are inadequate.
II. Corruption and Assessment of Remedial Effectiveness
Corruption Defined
There is no single globally accepted definition of corruption.
Transparency International, the leading international NGO seeking to curb
corruption, defines it as “the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain. The
main forms of corruption are bribery, embezzlement, fraud and extortion.”10
It can arise either as active bribery (the act of promising or giving the bribe),
as opposed to the act of receiving a bribe (passive bribery).11 It can
encompass domestic bribery (private to public and public to private);
corruption of foreign officials (international); facilitation payments;
compliance programs; jurisdictional issues to prosecute corruption;
exemptions; and remedies.12
Rampant: Globally and with EU and China
There seems to be no country free of corruption in trade.13 The U.S.
anticorruption law, the FCPA, shows its top enforcement actions may come
from the “cleanest” countries doing business in corrupt ones.14

10. Corruption Dictionary, GAN BUS. ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, https://www.ganinte
grity.com/portal/corruption-dictionary/. See also What is Corruption?, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption#define.
11. Glossary, U4 ANTI-CORRUPTION RESOURCE CTR., https://www.u4.no/terms.
12. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 10 (“Typical examples of corruption encountered
by foreigners are the solicitation of bribes to obtain foreign exchange, import, export,
investment or production licenses or to avoid paying tax, although for international investors
that sort of extortion amounts to an extra tax.”).
13. Index of Pub. Integrity, https://integrity-index.org. See Alina Mungui-Pippidi,
Fostering Good Governance Through Trade Agreements: An evidence-based review for the
workshop ‘EU anticorruption chapters in EU free trade and investment agreements’, EUR.
RES. CTR FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION AND STATE-BUILDING at 5 (Jan. 24, 2018), http://www.ro
maniacurata.ro/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/INTA-CORRUPTION-SEMINAR-AMP-SLID
ES-FOR-POSTING.pdf.
14. Lisa Thompson, A new No. 1: Petrobras agrees to biggest FCPA settlement,
BIZBLOG (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.lexisnexis.com/communities/lexisnexis_biz/b/bizblog/
archive/2018/10/05/a-new-no-1-petrobras-agrees-to-biggest-fcpa-settlement.aspx (The top
ten FCPA settlements involved: 1. Brazil; 2. Sweden; 3. Germany; 4. Netherlands; 5 and 6.
France; 7 and 8. U.S.; 9. Israel).
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Corruption remains endemic, and government leaders have failed to
make fundamental reforms.15
What is missing is active enforcement. Transparency International’s
new report, Exporting Corruption, finds that only 11 major exporting
countries—accounting for about a third of world exports—have active or
moderate law enforcement against companies bribing abroad in order to gain
mining rights, contracts for major construction projects, purchases of planes
and other deals.16
Regulatory Approaches Affecting EU and China
There are a variety of regulatory approaches used to combat corruption,
including: explicitly prohibiting corruption (criminal and civil), requiring
transactional transparency, good government (government integrity) by
international standards, self-standing conventions implemented by the
members, and free trade agreement provisions.
International Standards of Organizations and Conventions
While Global standards are often merely aspirational, they promote and
occasionally require action by their terms. China is covered by WBO and
UN “obligations” and the EU is covered by those and also OECD and EU
conventions, discussed below.
WTO and Anticorruption
There are no explicit provisions in WTO treaties that prohibit
corruption in trade, rather they rely on nondiscrimination and transparency
requirements.17 Besides tariffs, the elimination of quantitative, and other
non-tariff barriers to trade, there are a number of corruption deterrence
instruments in three treaties regulating the procedures governing certain
stages or types of trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT
1994), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and to a lesser

15. Mungiu-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance Through Trade Agreements: An
evidence-based review for the workshop ‘EU anticorruption chapters in EU free trade and
investment agreements’, supra note 13.
16. Id. See also China, 2019 INDEX OF ECON. FREEDOM, https://www.heritage.org/
index/country/china.
17. Padideh Ala’I, The WTO and the Anti-Corruption Movement, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L
L. REV. 259, 259-278 (2008), https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1060&context=facsch_lawrev.
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extent in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement).
All those agreements aim to reduce administrative discretion and, under
the rubric of ‘transparency, ’to provide for members to ensure that their
responsible officials will be unable to hide behind secretive processes to
grant government contracts or licenses on the basis of particularistic
considerations, whether protectionist or corrupt.18
There are additional WTO provisions which serve to deter corruption,
for example, the Government Procurement Act (GPA)19 and the Trade
Facilitation Agreement.20
GPA asks all participating countries to open up their markets and
establish independent “domestic review systems” which means mechanisms
to review complaints to which both foreign and domestic suppliers may
apply for correction of procedural errors. GPA also establishes additional
external oversight by making national procurement systems subject to
scrutiny by the WTO Committee on Government Procurement, and through
the WTO’s binding dispute settlement system.21
18. Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, supra
note 1, at 18 (“Recently the introduction of a monitoring mechanism was proposed and
innovative proposals on e-procurement are included.”).
19. Id. at 17. See GATT 1994: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art. X:1, Art. X:2,
Art. X:3(a), Art. X:3(b), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, (1994); see also GATS: General Agreement on
Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1B, Art. III:1, Art. VI:1, Art. VI:2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 (1994); and see
TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Art. 41:4, Art.
63:1, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994).
20. The Trade Facilitation Agreement, World Trade Organization, https://www.tfa
facility.org/trade-facilitation-agreement-facility (“Traders from both developing and
developed countries have long pointed to the vast amount of ‘red tape’ that still exists in
moving goods across borders, and … [the] TFA contains provisions for expediting the
movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit.… The Agreement will
help improve transparency, increase possibilities to participate in global value chains, and
reduce the scope for corruption.”).
21. Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, supra
note 1, at 17-18 (The Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) is the most direct
instrument to counter corruption among WTO Member governments. A multilateral treaty,
the GPA applies only to those Members which have accepted its provisions … “The Preamble
to the GPA sets out the three main goals of the parties regarding procurement. First, GPA
opens the market for government purchases to suppliers from all party territories. A second,
related goal of the GPA is non-discrimination in the procurement process. The parties
‘recognize ’that government procurement laws should not and should not aim to discriminate
in favor of national suppliers nor to the advantage of one country’s suppliers over those of
another. The third goal of the Government Procurement Agreement is to enhance the
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United Nations
There are two UN conventions relevant to the global fight against
corruption. The first is the United Nations Convention against Corruption
(UNCAC).22 It is the only legally binding, universal anticorruption
instrument.23 The actual implementation of the Convention into domestic
law by States is evaluated through a peer-review process, the Implementation
Review Mechanism, where assistance is provided to identify deficiencies in
a country’s regulatory process, but there is no direct enforcement
mechanism.24
The second convention is the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto (UNCTOC).25
This is the main international instrument in the fight against transnational
organized crime and includes protocols against human trafficking,
smuggling migrants, and illicit manufacturing and trafficking in firearms.26
OECD27
The OECD was founded in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and
world trade. In 1999, its AntiBribery Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions came into
force that requires its signatories to criminalize the bribery of foreign public
officials in international business transactions.28 Its global track record of

‘transparency of laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government
procurement’ and to provide for ‘fair’ procedures to ensure that the rules on procurement are
effective.”).
22. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41.
23. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 22. (“The Convention
covers five main areas: preventive measures, criminalization and law enforcement,
international cooperation, asset recovery, and technical assistance and information exchange.
The Convention covers many different forms of corruption, such as bribery, trading in
influence, abuse of functions, and various acts of corruption in the private sector.”).
24. Implementation Review Mechanism, UNODC, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
corruption/implementation-review-mechanism.html.
25. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000,
2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
26. Id.
27. Where: Global Reach, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/
(The 36 OECD countries have adopted this Convention.).
28. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions and Related Documents, Dec. 17, 1997, OECD.
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enforcement is annually updated.29 A monitoring mechanism exists, based
on peer-review; but the OECD has no sanctions itself within its authority.
Group of States Against Corruption
The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)30 was established in
1999 by the Council of Europe to monitor State compliance with the
organization’s anticorruption standards.31 Its members include countries
outside Europe and its objective is to improve the capacity of its members to
fight corruption by monitoring their compliance with its anticorruption
standards through a process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure.
In sum, the two UN conventions and GRECO all address matters of
corruption control with the focus on procedures. Countries are directed to
create anticorruption agencies and adopt legislation. The OECD focuses
more on enforcement; but like the others, it too is based on peer review and
lacks sanctions
European Union

29. OECD Working Group on Bribery, 2017 Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery
Convention, OECD at 1 (Nov. 2018), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/OECD-WGBEnforcement-Data-2018-ENG.pdf (Highlights from the 2017 data. Three countries adopted
law reforms designed to support more effective anti-bribery law enforcement. Reforms
include the lengthening the statute of limitations (Italy), creating corporate liability for
corruption (Argentina) and reinforcing laws on anti-money laundering laws and confiscation
of the proceeds of foreign bribery (Japan). Three Parties joined the list of jurisdictions that
are known to have sanctioned foreign bribery: Brazil, Spain and Australia. This brings to 23
the total number of Parties to the Convention that have sanctioned foreign bribery at least
once, but it also means that 21 Parties have never sanctioned foreign bribery.).
30. Members and Observers/Etats Membres et Observateurs, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://
www.coe.int/en/web/greco/structure/member-and-observers (Currently, GRECO comprises
49 member States (48 European States and the United States of America.).
31. GRECO, What is GRECO?, https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/about-greco/what-isgreco. (“It helps to identify deficiencies in national anti-corruption policies, prompting the
necessary legislative, institutional and practical reforms. GRECO also provides a platform for
the sharing of best practice in the prevention and detection of corruption. GRECO.
Membership in GRECO, which is an enlarged agreement, is not limited to Council of Europe
member States. Moreover, any State which becomes Party to the Criminal or Civil Law
Conventions on Corruption automatically accedes to GRECO and its evaluation procedures.
Legal instruments adopted by the Council of Europe: Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption (ETS 173), Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 174). Additional Protocol
to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 191), Twenty Guiding Principles against
Corruption (Resolution (97) 24), Recommendation on Codes of Conduct for Public Officials
(Recommendation No. R(2000)10), Recommendation on Common Rules against Corruption
in the Funding of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns (Recommendation
Rec(2003)4).”).
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The EU Convention Against Corruption Involving Officials became
effective in 1997 to fight corruption involving European officials or national
officials of Member States of the European Union (EU).32 Members are
required to take measures to ensure that passive or active corruption by
officials is a punishable criminal offense and that the laws include
jurisdiction.33
Perhaps the anticorruption standards with the most substantial global
impact is the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of the U.S.34
The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 is the first
major piece of national legislation aimed at combating bribery and the first
to introduce corporate liability, responsibility for third parties and extraterritoriality for corruption offenses. Prohibition of bribery payments is
limited to foreign officials, and the FCPA includes a limited exception for
facilitation payments. With nearly global jurisdiction, the FCPA is widely
enforced, and the current trend points towards increased enforcement
actions, fines and imprisonment.35
Its jurisdictional presence is felt around the world and its recent practice
of seeking claims on behalf of other countries promises more cooperation in
the future.36 Its anticorruption approach is two-fold: One that addresses
accounting transparency requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and another concerning bribery of foreign officials. The law has
penalties, civil and criminal, and a track record of successes in prosecution.37

32. Convention Drawn Up on the Basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European
Union on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or
Officials of Member States of the European Union, June 25, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 195) 2.
33. Id. (Jurisdiction must cover the following cases. “… when the offence is committed
in whole or in part within its territory; when the offender is one of its nationals or one of its
officials; when the offence is committed against European or national officials or against a
member of the EU institutions who is also one of its nationals; when the offender is a
European official working for a European Community institution, agency or body that has its
headquarters in the Member State in question.”).
34. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (2004).
35. FCPA Compliance Guide, Compliance Guides, GAN BUS. ANTI-CORRUPTION
PORTAL, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/compliance-quick-guides/united-states/.
36. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 25.
37. Identify FCPA Foreign Corruption Anti-Bribery Risks and Prevent Violations,
Regulations, VISUAL OFAC, https://www.visualofac.com/regulations/fcpa-violationspenalties/ (Civil and criminal penalties for FCPA Anti-bribery and Books and Records
violations are significant.). See also Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Fraud Section
Home, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corruptpractices-act.
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Another evolving alternative to government enforcement in the U.S. is
the individual filing of derivative lawsuits through which shareholders can
sue a company’s directors and officers for breaching their fiduciary duties to
that company.38
Free Trade Agreements ’Anticorruption Provisions
International trade agreements are reported to help in the control of
corruption in two ways: “by increasing competition directly, due to removal
of tariffs thereby diminishing the power of rentier companies which
influence regulation in their favor and by contributing to a fairer business
environment through transparency provisions.”39
… the expansion of trade across the most diverse governance
regimes has meant that non-tariff measures (NTMs) began to
weigh considerably, so needing an approach to achieve a degree
of regulatory coherence across jurisdictions. That then led to the
common tendency of modern RTAs to address regulatory areas
such as transparency and anti-corruption provisions.…40
This need for regional coherency has led to nearly half of the RTAs
incorporating anticorruption and antibribery commitments.41
The provisions come in different forms; for example, anticorruption,
transparency, and good government (government integrity) provisions that

38. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 26 (“For instance, in In Re Petrobras Securities
Litigation a group of shareholders allege that Petrobras issued ‘materially false and
misleading’ financial statements and ‘false and misleading statements regarding the integrity
of its management and the effectiveness of its financial control.”).
39. Id. at 16 (“For over half a century non-discrimination and transparency have been
basic principles of agreements governing world trade, with the goal of ensuring a level playing
field for foreign businesses…. Dedicated anti-corruption provisions are of more recent date,
although their goal of equal treatment of businesses regardless of country of origin remains
the same.”).
40. Id. at 16-17. See also Jenkins, Anti-Corruption and Transparency Provisions in
Trade Agreements, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Feb. 6, 2017), supra note 9. Stefan Mbiyavanga,
Improving domestic governance through international investment law: Should bilateral
investment treaties learn from international anti-corruption conventions?, 2017 OED GLOBAL
ANTI-CORRUPTION & INTEGRITY FORUM (Mar. 31, 2017), http://iffoadatabase.trustafrica.org/
iff/Integrity-Forum-2017-Mbiyavanga-international-investment-law.pdf.
41. Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, supra
note 1, at 17.
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aim to keep transactions open and thus more likely to be non-corrupt.42 A
“model” anti-bribery clause has been suggested, modeled after OECD
obligations.43 Some trade agreements like the CPTPP and the EU-Canada
CETA provide protections that allow investors to seek restitution outside the
host state’s judicial system through an arbitration tribunal, where that state
has not complied with its treaty obligations.
However, it has been noted, what happens if a country lacks the “proper
institutions for the desired implementation; for instance, judicial
independence? Mechanisms might exist in trade agreements but have no
impact if further development of enforcement structures is not pursued.”44
As reforms may proceed, international arbitration is increasingly used to
provide remedies. Over time, investor-state arbitration has proved to be an
emerging space for enforcement of international norms—including
transparency and anticorruption.45
Regulatory Variables
The relevant laws and their effectiveness will be assessed based on the
following variables.46

III. Legal
International Obligations and Sanctions
International standards and conventions, such as from WBO, UN,
OECD, OECD Anti-Corruption Convention,47 GRECO, and the EU
42. Augusto Lopez-Claros, Six Strategies to Fight Corruption, WORLD BANK BLOGS,
https://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01605/WEB/2042.HTM.
43. Mbiyavanga, supra note 40.
44. Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, supra
note 1, at 25. See also Matt Reeder, State Corruption in ICSID BIT Arbitration: Can it be
Estopped?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Mar. 9, 2017), http://arbitrationblog.kluwer
arbitration.com/2017/03/09/state-corruption-in-icsid-bit-arbitration/, for a discussion on the
use of corruption as a bar to arbitration.
45. Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, supra
note 1, at 25.
46. Not assessed is the relevant status of individual country’s rule of law—which is
indispensable to effective enforcement of the laws at the domestic level.
47. OECD, Ratification Status as of May 2018, OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUB. OFFICIALS IN INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS (May 2018), https://
www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf (The states ratifying the OECD
Anti-Corruption Convention include Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Republic of Moldova, Monaco,
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Convention Against Corruption Involving Officials, require a state’s
commitment to its legislative obligations and having enforcement provisions
in place.48 The EU, selected EU Members,49 and China50 have agreed to
adhere to the following:

EU

WTO

UN

X

X

OECD

OECD
Anticorruption
Convention

GRECO

EU
AntiCorruption
Convention
Involving
Officials

Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian
Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
Ratification Status as of May 2017.)
48. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 22 (EU and China are
parties in in WTO and both UN instruments.). United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 25. Where: Global Reach, supra note 27 (But
they are not members of OECD or GRECO.). Members and Observers/Etats Membres et
Observateurs, supra note 30. OECD, Implementation of the Anti-Corruption Action Plan,
ADB/OECD ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVE, https://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corrup
tioninitiative/implementationoftheanti-corruptionactionplan.htm (China has endorsed the
ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific Plan. Though it has no enforcement
mechanism, it does provide for possible technical support and advising. Implementation of
the Anti-Corruption Action Plan. “By endorsing the Anti-Corruption Action Plan for AsiaPacific, the Initiative’s member countries have committed to undertake meaningful reform to
bolster their safeguards against corruption. Under the Action Plan’s implementation
mechanism, countries have committed to “endeavor, in consultation with the Secretariat of
the Initiative, to identify priority reform areas which would fall under any of the three pillars
and aim to implement these in a workable timeframe.”).
49. UK, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and Netherlands.
50. Gillian Dell & Andrew McDevitt, Exporting Corruption – Progress Report 2018:
Assessing Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, TRANSPARENCY INT’L at 23
(October 2018), https://www.transparency.org/files/content/publication/Download_a_short_
version_of_the_report.pdf (“In 2014-2017, China’s average share of world exports of goods
and services was 10.8 per cent, compared with the United States’ 9.9 per cent. As the world’s
leading exporter, China has a special responsibility with respect to the practices of its
companies and business people abroad, as they have a significant impact on trade practices.
China’s performance regarding international anticorruption standards influences attitudes and
behavior in other major exporting countries. Likewise, other major exporters such as Hong
Kong, India and Singapore, covered in this report but not to date party to the OECD
Convention, have a responsibility to contribute to tackling corruption in the supply side of
international trade.”)
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The primary role of these international organizations is to gain the
domestic adoption of the standards and the monitoring thereafter with actual
enforcement left to each state.51 The shortcoming of the above “obligations”
is that the method of their implementation and ultimate enforcement are left
to the states and their domestic laws. “Monitoring mechanisms and collective
sanctions are mentioned as enforcement means, but seldom implemented.
Relying on peer-review evaluations the UN conventions, GRECO and the
OECD completely lack any sanctions mechanism.”52
On the other hand, though the OECD, itself, has no sanctions within its
authority, its Anti-Bribery Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions has had some impact
and success.53 Its global track record of enforcement/implementation by the
signatories is annually updated, with the latest 2017 figures below. The
Convention has a monitoring mechanism, based on peer-review; 560
individuals and 184 entities have received criminal sanctions for foreign
bribery between the time the Convention entered into force in 1999 and the
end of 2017.
At least 125 of the sanctioned individuals have been sentenced to prison
for foreign bribery, including at least 11 for prison terms exceeding 5 years.
For the 97 individuals for whom information is available on the length
of (non-suspended) prison terms, 11 were for more than 5 years, 41 were in
the 2-5-year range, 26 in the 1-2year range and 19 were less than 1 year.
Over 500 investigations are ongoing in 30 Parties.

51. Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European
Union on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or
officials of Member States of the European Union, supra note 32 (Art. 12 of the Convention
stipulates “that any dispute will in an initial stage be examined by the Council in accordance
with the procedure set out in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union with a view to reaching
a solution. If no solution is found within six months, a Member State party or the Member
States parties to the dispute may refer the dispute to the Court of Justice for a ruling.”).
52. Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, supra
note 1, at 26. See also Foreign Bribery Enforcement: What Happens to the Public Officials
on the Receiving End?, OECD (2018), http://www.oecd.org/corruption/Foreign-BriberyEnforcement-What-Happens-to-the-Public-Officials-on-the-Receiving-End.pdf.
53. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions and Related Documents, supra note 28.
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At least 155 criminal proceedings (against 146 individuals and 9
entities) are ongoing for foreign bribery in 11 Parties.54
Some critics observe that the impact has been minimal, as only
Germany, the UK and US actually implement the convention.55 Furthermore,
according to a 2018 OECD report, public officials accepting bribes from
OECD-based companies are said to run little risk of being punished,
The report looks at what happened to the public officials in a set of 55
concluded cases between 2008 and 2013 where OECD-based companies
were punished for bribing foreign public officials. Of the 55 concluded
foreign bribery cases, in only one-fifth were formal sanctions imposed on
one or more public officials. This is particularly striking because it is for
cases in which both sides of the bribe transaction—the briber and the public
official on the receiving end—were subject to the jurisdiction of Parties to
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, a group of countries that have relatively
advanced law enforcement and public sector management capabilities.56
Still others conclude, “the most significant achievement of the OECD
is that it all member states had effective legislation in place for liability of
legal persons and expanded their jurisdictional scope to reach extraterritorial
activities of companies. All 43 state parties to the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention now recognize the liability of legal persons
for foreign bribery.”57
State Laws
China

54. OECD Working Group on Bribery, supra note 29 (Highlights from the 2017 data:
“Three countries adopted law reforms designed to support more effective anti-bribery law
enforcement. Reforms include the lengthening the statute of limitations (Italy), creating
corporate liability for corruption (Argentina) and reinforcing laws on anti-money laundering
laws and confiscation of the proceeds of foreign bribery (Japan). Three Parties joined the list
of jurisdictions that are known to have sanctioned foreign bribery: Brazil, Spain and Australia.
This brings to 23 the total number of Parties to the Convention that have sanctioned foreign
bribery at least once, but it also means that 21 Parties have never sanctioned foreign bribery.”).
55. Seunghyun Nam, Domestic Impact of the Management Process Under the OECD
Anti- Bribery Convention, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 955, 970 (2018).
56. Foreign Bribery Enforcement: What Happens to the Public Officials on the
Receiving End?, supra note 52.
57. Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good Governance through Trade Agreements, supra
note 1, at 23.
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China is the “world’s largest exporter, with over 10 per cent of global
exports and it is failing to enforce its own laws on foreign [emphasis added]
bribery.”58
Although China is attractive for FDI, multi-nationals must know with
whom they do business and be aware of the inherent risks of corruption.
Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks
China a relatively poor 40th.59 A 2018 report, Exporting Corruption 2018,
“assesses country enforcement against foreign bribery in line with
obligations in the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. It classifies 44 countries
into four bands of enforcement based on the data available regarding how
much they investigate and prosecute companies that pay bribes to win
business abroad; China is in the fourth and bottom band of 22 countries with
little or no enforcement.”60
Although China is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on
Corruption, China, under President Xi Jinping, has actively pursued
domestic anticorruption policies.61 China now “offers a comprehensive legal
framework in both the public and private sectors to criminalize several
corrupt practices such as facilitation payments, money laundering, active and
58. Gillian Dell, Time for China to Step Up to Global Anti-Corruption Responsibilities,
MEDIUM (Oct. 19, 2018), https://voices.transparency.org/time-for-china-to-step-up-to-globalanti-corruption-responsibilities-fffb80d565be. See also Mungui-Pippidi, Fostering Good
Governance through Trade Agreements, supra note 1. Dell & McDevitt, supra note 50 (“In
2014-2017, China’s average share of world exports of goods and services was 10.8 per cent,
compared with the United States’ 9.9 per cent. As the world’s leading exporter, China has a
special responsibility with respect to the practices of its companies and business people
abroad, as they have a significant impact on trade practices. China’s performance regarding
international anti-corruption standards influences attitudes and behavior in other major
exporting countries.”).
59. Mark Jenkins, Sunny Chu & Christopher Meadors, FCPA compliance in China,
FRAUD MAG. (Mar. 2014), https://www.fraud-magazine.com/article.aspx?id=4294982094.
60. Dell, supra note 58.
61. Li Hui, In Chinese Corruption Cases, Who’s Taking What?, SIXTH TONE (Dec. 4,
2018), https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1003273/in-chinese-corruption-cases%2C-whos-ta
king-what%3F# (It is argued that “the scale of China’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign
defies simple description. Over the past six years, more than 1.5 million officials have been
sanctioned as part of the crackdown, ranging from village committee members to some of the
country’s most powerful bureaucrats.”). China Corruption Report, GAN BUS. ANTICORRUPTION PORTAL, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/china/ (“It has
been alleged that the anti-corruption campaign is at least partly politically motivated.
Companies are likely to experience bribery, political interference or facilitation payments
when acquiring public services and dealing with the judicial system. The common practice of
guanxi is a custom for building connections and relationships based on gifts, banqueting, or
small favors. Guanxi-related gifts can be considered bribery by foreign companies and by
national and international anti-corruption laws. Companies are advised to carefully consider
the type and value of gifts, the occasion, and the nature of the business relation.”).
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passive bribery, and gifts in the public and in the private sector with the AntiUnfair Competition Law focusing on commercial bribery.”62
The Criminal Code establishes the penalties for those bribing (active)
and those bribed (passive), ranging from life imprisonment for the former
and 10 years ’imprisonment for the latter. Private bribery is regulated by the
Criminal Code and the PRC Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL).63
“Bribery ’under the Criminal Law means “giving money or property to
an incumbent or former public official, or the person related to the public
official (i.e., a close relative or any other person closely related to the
incumbent or former public official) for the purpose of securing illegitimate
benefits.”64 Public officials are broadly defined and include personnel in
public service, state-owned enterprises, institutions, and organizations.65
Private bribery is regulated by the Criminal Code and the PRC AntiUnfair Competition Law (AUCL). Under Article 164 of the Criminal Code,
“private bribery” means “giving money or property to any employee of a
company, enterprise or other entity for the purpose of seeking improper
interests and benefits. Penalties for violation are up to 10 years ’
imprisonment.”66
62. China Corruption Report, supra note 61 (While China has criminalized the bribery
of foreign public officials, in line with obligations under the UN Convention against
Corruption, there has been no known enforcement by China against foreign corrupt practices
by its companies, citizens or residents.).
63. Mini vandePol, Simon Hui, & Vivian Wu, Anti-Corruption in China, GLOBAL
COMPLIANCE NEWS, https://globalcompliancenews.com/anti-corruption/handbook/anti-cor
ruption-in-china/. Dell & McDevitt, supra note 50 (“While China has criminalized the bribery
of foreign public officials, in line with obligations under the UN Convention against
Corruption, there has been no known enforcement by China against foreign corrupt practices
by its companies, citizens or residents.”).
64. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (Mar. 14,
1997), https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/5375/108071/F-78796243/CHN
5375%20Eng3.pdf (Criminal Code, Articles 389, 390, 390A, and 393). vandePol, Hui, & Wu,
supra note 63.
65. vandePol, Hui, & Wu, supra note 63. Jenkins, Chu, & Meadors, supra note 59
(Under the U.S. law, FCPA, the “definition of a ‘foreign official’ in China can be more
problematic than in other countries. The DOJ and SEC broadly interpret it to include all
Communist Party of China (CPC) members—a large population. The CPC runs parallel to the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in structure and membership. The two entities are difficult
to separate and appear to be indistinguishable. (Refer to the PDF, Daniel Chow, China Under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 587.)). China Corruption Report, supra note 61 (CPC
members may have businesses in the private sector, and if a multinational does business with
or acquires a CPC-owned company or CPC employee, that CPC member may use political
connections/favors to obtain business.).
66. vandePol, Hui, & Wu, supra note 63 (“The Interim Provisions on Prohibition of
Commercial Bribery also describe the forms of private bribery under the AUCL, which
include any money or property provided to the business counterparty or its employee for
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Article 8 of the AUCL, “private bribery” means giving money or
property, or secret and off-the-book kickbacks to a business counterparty or
its employee or using other means to bribe a business counterparty or its
employee for selling or purchasing goods.”67
On January 1, 2018, a revised AUCL took effect.68 Compared with the
previous version of the AUCL, the current AUCL clarifies the definition of
commercial bribery by listing three categories of entities or individuals who
could be the recipients of bribes; “(1) an employee of the other party to a
transaction; (2) the entity or individual authorized by the other party to a
transaction to handle relevant affairs; and (3) an entity or an individual that
uses power or influence to affect a transaction.”69
A significant change in the current AUCL, compared to the previous
version of the AUCL, is that the transaction counterparty itself has been
excluded from the categories of potential bribe recipients, which effectively
narrows the scope of commercial bribery. It is particularly notable that while
individual employees of transaction counterparties are included in the
categories of potential bribe recipients, transaction counterparties
themselves are excluded. On this basis, one of the potential interpretations
could be that beneficial payments made between the two transactional
parties, such as transactional rebates, may be excluded from the scope of
commercial bribery.70
There are three levels of penalties provided by the current AUCL.
Where a noncriminal administrative offense of commercial bribery is found,
promotion, publicity, sponsorship, scientific research, labor, consultancy, commission,
reimbursement, or any other benefits such as trips or visits.”).
67. Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, WIPO (Sept. 2,
1993), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn011en.pdf. vandePol, Hui, & Wu,
supra note 63.
68. Hui Xu, Catherine Palmer, Tina Wang, & Sean Wu, China’s Newly Amended AntiUnfair Changes the Rules of the Game, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (2018), https://www.lw.
com/thoughtLeadership/china-newly-amended-anti-unfair-competition-law-latham
(“November 4, 2017, the 30th Session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National
People’s Congress passed the revised AUCL, went into effect 2018.”).
69. Hui Xu, Sean Wu, & Catherine Palmer, Bribery & Corruption 2019 China, GLI,
https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regula
tions/china.
70. Xu, Wu, & Palmer, supra note 69 (“The current AUCL retains the safe harbor
provisions which allow a business to explicitly pay a discount to the other party to the
transaction, or pay a commission to an intermediary, as long as both parties faithfully make a
record in their accountancy book. It is important to note that under the Law of the PRC on
Donations for Public Welfare (the ‘Donation Law’), donations are to be made voluntarily and
gratis. Any monetary or goods contributions that are made as donations but with the
commercial purpose of seeking economic benefits or transaction opportunities will be seen as
commercial bribes.”).
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the authorities will confiscate illegal gains, and, depending on the severity of
the conduct, impose a fine of between RMB 100,000 and RMB 3,000,000.71
In China, both private and public bribery are illegal. It is a crime to bribe a
public official regardless of the amount, while private bribes must be over
RMB 60,000 to be a crime.72
In China, anticorruption enforcement is not centralized, with many
different government agencies tasked with fighting corruption. The Supreme
People’s Procuratorates are the prosecutors but investigations are conducted
by the General Administration for Combating Embezzlement and Bribery
and the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention. Penalties include
imprisonment up to 10 years and fines that are at the discretion of the PRC.73
Additionally, at the CCP level the CPC Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection, investigates and disciplines cadres that violate the law.74
In its March 2018 meeting, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC)
approved a constitutional amendment creating a super-sized anticorruption
body [emphasis added] called the National Supervision Commission and
adopted a Supervision Law to govern its operations. A massive institutional
restructuring plan subsequently issued by the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) makes clear the Commission will be co-located with—and integrate
its anticorruption functions with—the CCP’s own powerful anti-graft body,
the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) …. But the Law
fails to subject anticorruption work to the due process requirements of
China’s criminal justice and administrative law. systems. Instead, its
stipulations appear to be enforceable only by the state supervisors it purports
to regulate and by the CCDI.75

71. See Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra note
67 (Authorities may also revoke the business license of the business operator in question if
the situation is sufficiently serious.). See also Xu, Wu, & Palmer, supra note 69.
72. Xu, Wu, & Palmer, supra note 69.
73. Business ethics and anti-corruption laws: China, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (June
2016), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/406af5db/businessethics-and-anti-corruption-laws-china.
74. Id.
75. Jamie P. Horsley, What’s so controversial about China’s new anti-corruption body?,
BOOKINGS (May 30, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/whats-so-controversialabout-chinas-new-anti-corruption-body/ (“This arrangement makes the National Supervision
Commission ultimately accountable only to the CCP, threatening both to undermine efforts
to establish law-based governance and to complicate China’s global anti-corruption
campaign. … Foreign governments may have concerns about certain aspects of international
legal cooperation with China. The National Supervision Commission may take over a leading
role in coordinating with foreign governments in areas such as anti-corruption law
enforcement, extradition, judicial assistance, custody transfer of sentenced persons, asset
recovery, and information exchanges.”).
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China has extraterritorial jurisdiction. In China, in accordance with
Articles 6 and 7 of the PRC Criminal Law, anticorruption laws apply to
Chinese nationals both within and outside China, and to all companies
incorporated in China (and their managers) which carry on business
overseas.76 Under Article 30 of the PRC Criminal Law, corporations can be
held liable for the acts of their employees, directors and officers under
criminal, administrative and civil regulations.77
European Union
In addition to the initiative of each state to create anticorruption
legislation, the EU Convention Against Corruption Involving Officials 1997
obligates each Member State, including the selected EU Members discussed
below, to take the necessary measures to ensure that conduct constituting an
act of passive corruption or active corruption by officials is a punishable
criminal offense and ensures that conduct constituting an act of passive or
active corruption, as well as participating in and instigating these acts, is
punishable by criminal penalties.78

76. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 64, at Art. 6-7.
77. Id. at Art. 30.
78. Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European
Union on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or
officials of Member States of the European Union, supra note 32. European Anti-Corruption
Conventions, Anti-Corruption Legislation, GAN BUS. ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL,
https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/anti-corruption-legislation/european-anti-corruptionconventions/ (There are also a number of other anticorruption European convention. “Council
of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (COE Criminal Law Convention). The
COE Criminal Law Convention aims to coordinate the criminalization of corrupt practices,
provide complementary criminal law measures and improve cooperation for the prosecution
of offences. It entered into force in 2002, and compliance is monitored by the Group of States
against Corruption (GRECO). Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (COE
Civil Law Convention) The COE Civil Law Convention aims to define common international
rules of civil law and corruption. Parties are required to compensate persons who have
suffered damage as a result of corruption. It entered into force in 2003, and compliance is
monitored by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). European Union Convention
against Corruption Involving Officials (EU Convention against Corruption). The EU
Convention against Corruption aims to fight corruption involving EU or Member States’
officials. Member States must ensure that passive or active corruption by officials is a criminal
offence. Heads of businesses are to be declared criminally liable for active corruption by a
person under their authority acting on behalf of the company. European Union Convention on
the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests (EU Convention on
Financial Interests). The EU Convention on Financial Interests aims to create a common legal
basis for the criminal protection of the EC’s financial interests. Fraud affecting expenditure
and revenue must be punishable by criminal penalties.”).
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Selected EU Members79
In the summary below (including China) followed by a chart of the
laws, the variables of Selected EU Member State’s anticorruption laws80 are
highlighted;81 but the question always remains—is there effective
enforcement?
Domestic Laws
Laws and Coverage82
Although the Members use different terminology, the basic concept of
a bribe is common to each of the Selected EU Members ’domestic law: “a
79.
80.

These Members are UK, Germany, France, Netherlands, Spain, and Italy.
The anticorruption laws of the Selected EU States follow. UK: Bribery Act 2010,
LEGISLATION.GOV.UK (2010), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents.
Germany: Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Korruption, BUNDESANZEIGER VERLAG (Nov. 2015),
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start=//*%255B
@attr_id=%27bgbl115s2025.pdf%27%255D#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27
bgbl115s2025.pdf%27%5D__1464341755722%20/. France: Sapin II (2016), https://
www.cjoint.com/doc/16_12/ FLknuHuFltM_loisapin2.pdf. Spain: Criminal Code Art. 286 &
419-38, MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA (2013), https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/64
43/file/Spain_CC_am2013_en.pdf. Italy: Codice penale Art. 318-322, ALTALEX.COM (2020),
https://www.altalex.com/documents/codici-altalex/2014/10/30/codice-penale. Netherlands:
Wetboek van Strafrech 177-178, SHERLOC UNODC (Aug. 27, 2014), https://sherloc.unodc.
org/res/cld/document/nld/1881/penal-code-of-the-netherlands_html/ Netherlands_Penal_Co
de_1881_as_amd_2014.pdf. Also included is China: Hui Xu, Sean Wu, & Catherine Palmer,
Bribery & Corruption 2020|China, GLI, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-ar
eas/bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regulations/china. See generally Mungiu-Pippidi, supra
note 1.
81. For an overview description of each law, see as follows. Germany: Thomas Helck,
Bribery & Corruption 2020|Germany, GLI, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practiceareas/bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regulations/germany#chaptercontent1. Spain: Rafael
Jimenez-Gusi, Cecilia Pastor, & Diego Pol, Anti-Corruption in Spain, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE
NEWS, https://globalcompliancenews.com/anti-corruption/anti-corruption-in-spain/. UK:
Jonathan Pickworth & Jo Dimmock, Bribery & Corruption 2020|United Kingdom, GLI,
https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regula
tions/united-kingdom#chaptercontent1. France: Eric Lasry, Sara Koski, & Clotilde GuyotRechard, Anti-Corruption in France, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEWS, https://globalcomplia
ncenews.com/anti-corruption/handbook/anti-corruption-in-france/. Italy: Riccardo Ovidi,
Italy’s New Anti-Corruption Law, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEWS (Mar. 15, 2019), https://glo
balcompliancenews.com/italys-new-anti-corruption-law-20190228/.
82. See Bonelli E. Pappalardo et al., Complying with Bribery Laws in Key European
Jurisdictions, De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek (2012), https://www.debrauw.com/wpcontent/uploads/NEWS%20-%20PUBLICATIONS/European-Bribery-Memo.pdf (for more
on EU member bribery laws).
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benefit, or something of value, given to someone to affect their behavior for
the benefit of the offender or someone he represents or favors.”83 All
Selected EU Members expressly (or effectively) treat rewarding after the
event as bribery.84 The bribery of domestic or foreign officials is also an
offense in each of the Member States.85
The UK, Germany, and France criminalize private to private bribery the
same as private to public.86 In Italy, in the private sector, only certain key
corporate officers face criminal liability for bribery; and then only if their
actions are against the interests of their company.87 Spain criminalizes
private sector bribery if it infringes the relevant person’s obligations in the
acquisition or sale of goods or the hiring of professional services.88 In the
Netherlands, private sector bribery is criminalized if the bribed person
conceals his gift or promise from his employer in breach of the requirement
to act in good faith.89
The laws of the Selected EU Members broadly criminalize bribery by
public officials (or their acceptance of bribes) at home or abroad and the
bribery in the private sector; however, they take slightly different approaches
to so-called “facilitation payments.”90
The definitions of “public official” vary between the Selected EU
Members, but all have a “wide spectrum, generally presenting non-exclusive
examples, extending to EU and other supra-national or international
functionaries and key decision makers (such as judges).”91 In each of the
Member States, the term may extend to executives of foreign nationalized
industries.92
Remedies and Enforcement Agencies

83. Id. at 1.
84. See Selected EU Member laws, supra note 80.
85. Id.
86. See Selected EU Member laws: UK, Germany, and France, supra note 80.
87. Codice penale Art. 318-322, ALTALEX.COM (2020), https://www.altalex.com/
documents/codici-altalex/2014/10/30/codice-penale.
88. Criminal Code Art. 286 & 419-38, MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA (2013), https://www.
legislationline.org/ download/id/6443/file/Spain_CC_am2013_en.pdf.
89. Wetboek van Strafrech 177-178, SHERLOC UNODC (Aug. 27, 2014), https://sherloc.
unodc.org/res/cld/document/nld/1881/penal-code-of-thenetherlands_html/Nether
lands_Penal_Code_1881_as_amd_2014.pdf.
90. See generally Selected EU Member laws, supra note 80. See also Bonelli E.
Pappalardo et al., supra note 82.
91. See also Bonelli E. Pappalardo et al., supra note 82, at 2.
92. See Selected EU Member laws, supra note 80.
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All Selected EU Members impose serious penalties on offenders. These
include confiscation of the benefits of the bribery, substantial fines, and
prison terms.93 All provide some form of penalties for legal entities.94 In
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK, violating corporations can be banned
from public contracting.95 “Other potential penalties include withdrawal of
public subsidies or funding (Germany, Italy, Spain), disqualification from
carrying on the business in which the bribery occurred (France, Italy, Spain),
withdrawal of licenses (Germany, Italy), court supervision (France, Italy)
and liquidation (France, Italy, Spain).”96 The UK, Germany, France, and
Italy may sentence violators up to ten years in prison while in Spain and the
Netherlands the max is six years. Each nation has a different cap on fines,
ranging from €600,000 to an unlimited amount.97
The Selected EU Members have two different approaches to
enforcement infrastructure. The UK, Spain, France, and Italy have separate
departments established to prosecute corruption cases.98 While, Germany
and the Netherlands put the task to the state prosecutor’s office.99
Extra-territorial Jurisdiction and Corporate Liability
The laws of all Selected EU Members have some extraterritorial effect.
All criminalize the bribery of domestic officials (by anyone) and of foreign
officials by their own nationals, or legal entities established or carrying on
business in their territories, even if the bribery occurs overseas provided it is
also illegal where it occurs.100 In the UK, an act committed overseas which
would be considered bribery in the UK, may be criminalized unless it is

93. Id.
94. See Selected EU Member laws, supra note 80.
95. Selected EU Member laws: Germany, Spain, and Italy, supra note 80.
96. Westbroek, supra note 82, at 3.
97. See, Selected EU Member laws; Bribery Act (U.K., 2010, 23). Law on the Fight
Against Corruption (Ger., 2019, 2). Sapin II (Fr., 2017). Criminal Code (Spain, 2013, 286 &
419-38). Criminal Code (It., 2015, 318-22). Criminal Code (Neth., 2012, 177-78). See also,
Westbroek supra note 82.
98. Spain: Spanish Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office, https://www.mjusticia.gob.
es/cs/Satellite/Portal/es/inicio. UK: Serious Fraud Office, https://www.sfo.gov.uk/.France:
French Anti-Corruption Agency, https://www.economie.gouv.fr/. Italy: Italian Anticorruption
Authority, https://www.anticorruzione.it/portal/public/classic/MenuServizio/ENG/Aboutus.
99. Germany:https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/bribery-and-corrupti
on-laws-andregulations/germany#chaptercontent1; Netherlands: https://www.globallegalins
ights.com/practice-areas/bribery-andcorruption-laws-and-regulations/netherlands.
100. See Selected EU Member laws: UK, Germany, and France, supra note 80.
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expressly permitted by local written law, and a corporation can incur liability
on account of acts of bribery by associated persons outside the jurisdiction.101
Similarly, in the Netherlands, bribery of public officials by Dutch corporates
or Dutch nationals is criminalized irrespective of whether it is illegal where
the bribery occurs, however, some part of the improper conduct must occur
within its borders.102 Italy subjects companies carrying on business within its
borders to its worldwide jurisdiction where the bribery concerns public
officials if some part of the improper conduct (including its mere conception
and/or planning) has been carried out in Italy.103 In France, Germany, and
Spain, persons and businesses are liable for any act of bribery as long as it is
illegal in the location the act was committed.104 Additionally, in Spain any
bribery of a foreign public official is illegal.105

Summary Chart
Country
United
Kingdom

Laws and Coverage
Both private and
public Illegal

Extraterritorial
Any bribe that isn’t
expressly permitted by
foreign law

Remedies
Up to 10
years in
prison. Fine
Unlimited

Corporate
Liability

Enforcement Agency

May be liable for
acts by “associated
persons”.

Serious Fraud Office

101. Bribery Act 2010, LEGISLATION.GOV.UK (2010), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2010/23/contents.
102. Wetboek van Strafrech 177-178, SHERLOC UNODC (Aug. 27, 2014), https://sherloc.
unodc.org/res/cld/document/nld/1881/penal-code-of-thenetherlands_html/Netherlands_Pen
al_Code_1881_as_amd_2014.pdf.
103. Codice penale Art. 318-322, ALTALEX.COM (2020), https://www.altalex.com/docu
ments/codici-altalex/2014/10/30/codice-penale.
104. Germany: Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Korruption, BUNDESANZEIGER VERLAG (Nov.
2015), https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start=//*%
255B@attr_id=%27bgbl115s2025.pdf%27%255D#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3
D%27bgbl115s2025.pdf%27%5D__1464341755722%20/. France: Sapin II (2016), https://
www.cjoint.com/doc/16_12/ FLknuHuFltM_loisapin2.pdf.
105. Criminal Code Art. 286 & 419-38, MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA (2013), https://
www.legislationline.org/download/id/6443/file/Spain_CC_am2013_en.pdf.

3 - Brown_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete)

Summer 2020]

4/24/2020 2:05 PM

EU-China FTA

235

Germany

Both private and
public Illegal

Any bribe that is also
a crime in the foreign
nation

Up to 10
years in
prison. Fine
up to €10
Million.

May be liable for
acts by employees or
agents acting on
behalf of the
corporation.

State Prosecutor
Office

France

Both private and
public Illegal

Any bribe that is also
a crime in the foreign
nation

Up to 10
years in
prison. Fine
up to €5
Million.

May be liable for
acts for their benefit
by employees or
other
representatives.

French
AntiCorruption Agency

Netherlands

Public illegal,
private only if bribe is
concealed and
breaches duty of
loyalty

Only Dutch nationals
if some part of act was
in Netherlands

Up to 6
years in
prison. Fine
up to
€820,000

May be liable if
conduct can
reasonably be
attributed to the
corporation.

State Prosecutor
Office

Spain

Public illegal,
private only if related
to hiring.

Any bribery of a
foreign public official
or any bribe that is also
a crime in the foreign
nation

Up to 6
years in
prison. Fine
up to 5x
profit

May be liable for
acts for their benefit
by employees or
other
representatives.

Anti-Corruption
Prosecutor’s Office

Italy

Public illegal,
Any bribery of public
private only if by key officials if some part of
corporate officers; and act was in Italy
only if it goes against
corporate interests.

Up to 10
years in
prison. Fine
up to
€600,000.

May be liability for
acts undertaken by
employees or
“associated persons”

National AntiCorruption
Authority

China

Public Illegal,
private if over RMB
60,000

May be liable for
the acts of their
employees, directors
and officers

National Bureau of
Corruption
Prevention of the
PRC & Supreme
People’s
Procuratorates

For Chinese
Up to 10
Nationals any act that years
is illegal in China, and
Fines at
any foreigners who act State’s
against the PRC state or discretion
against its citizens

Enforcement of Laws
Transparency International evaluated OECD countries ’foreign bribery
enforcement under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention; and below, the
Selected EU countries and China are separated and highlighted.106
106. Dell & McDevitt, supra note 50. (Transparency International explains its
methodology as follows. “The enforcement categories (Active, Moderate, Limited, Little or
No) show the level of enforcement efforts against foreign bribery. A country that is an “Active
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Active Enforcement: United States, Germany, UK, Italy.
Limited Enforcement: France, Netherlands,
Little or No Enforcement: Spain, and China.107
The enforcement of anticorruption laws in the Selected EU States is as
follows.
Between 2014-2017: Germany has commenced 40 investigations and
opened 13 cases for corruption charges; the UK has commenced 36
investigations and opened nine cases; Italy has commenced 27 investigations
and opened 16 cases; France has commenced 40 cases and opened one case;
the Netherlands commenced seven investigations and opened two cases; and
Spain has commenced six investigations and opened two cases.108
In the United Kingdom, the Serious Fraud Office, in charge of Bribery
Act enforcement, has conducted 36 complete investigations, and is currently
investigating 41 new cases.109
In France, the French Anti-Corruption Agency has achieved three
convictions since being created in 2017.110 Two high-profile bribery
investigations are still pending: one involving a French Olympic Committee
member accused of accepting bribes for voting for Brazil in 2016, and the
second involving Electricite de France that opened in 2018.111

enforcer” initiates many investigations into foreign bribery offences; these investigations
reach the courts; the authorities press charges and courts convict individuals and/or companies
both in ordinary cases and in major cases in which bribers are convicted and receive
substantial sanctions. “Moderate Enforcement” and “Limited Enforcement” indicate stages of
progress but are considered insufficient deterrence. Where there is “Little or No
Enforcement”, there is no deterrence.” Recent improvements in the legal frameworks and
enforcement are highlighted on pages 18-19).
107. Id. at 4. See also Foreign Bribery Rages Unchecked in Over Half of Global Trade,
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2018) https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/exportin
g-corruption-2018. (The number of investigations and prosecutions between 2014-2017 is
contained in a summarizing chart).
108. Dell & McDevitt, supra note 50.
109. Our Cases, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, https://www.sfo.gov.uk/our-cases/#aza (In 2018
the Serious Fraud Office secured convictions of two directors of Skansen Interiors Ltd.,
resulting in prison sentences of 12 and 20 months). Bribery & Corruption United Kingdom,
GLOBAL LEGAL INSIGHTS, (2019) https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/bribe
ry-and-corruption-laws-and-regulations/united-kingdom
110. Jones Day, France Takes Next Step in Anticorruption Enforcement: First “French
DPAs” and What Companies Should Know (Apr. 2018), https://www.jonesday.com/francetakes-next-step-in-anticorruption-enforcement-firstfrench-dpas-and-what-companiesshould-know-04-26-2018/.
111. GLI, Bribery & Corruption 2019 France, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/prac
tice-areas/bribery-andcorruption-laws-and-regulations/France/.
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German authorities since 1999 have convicted 67 legal entities and 328
individuals for violations of anticorruption laws.112 In 2014 about 20,000
corruption crimes were registered nationwide in Germany, whereas in 2017
that number dropped to about 5,000. A recent case was brought against
Airbus by the Munich Public Prosecutor for paying bribes in relation to the
sale of Fighter Jets and resulted in a fine of €81,300,000.113
In Italy, Milan prosecutors convicted the foreign companies Saipem
Spa for bribing Nigerian public officials resulting in the forfeiture of €24.5
million in profits. The Milan Court of Appeals is currently reviewing the
conviction and sentencing of the President of the Lombardy Region for
bribery. The Prosecutor’s Office of Rome is currently investigating top
Roman politicians and businessmen for corruption and conspiracy with
known Mafia figures.114
In Spain, there are ongoing cases of corruption in international
economic transactions under investigation in the courts; and in 2017, two
persons were convicted by the National High Court (Audiencia Nacional).115
In the Netherlands, over the last three years, Dutch prosecutors have
reached large settlements with many large corporations, VimpelCom Ltd
paid $ 397.5 million in 2016, Telia Company AB paid $274 million in 2017,
and ING Bank NV paid €775 million in 2018.116
Settlements may or may not be useful in fighting international
corruption. Transparency International’s position is that while useful, unless
they are made public, they do not deter corrupt practices.
Settlements can provide an important channel to hold companies to
account for wrongdoing and resolve foreign bribery cases without resorting
to a full trial or administrative proceeding. In many cases, they have helped
to boost enforcement of foreign bribery laws and to improve corporate
compliance. However, their deterrent effect is questionable if they are not
transparent, do not provide effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions,
and if there is no meaningful judicial review.117
112. OECD, IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION: GERMANY 5
(Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2018), http://www.oecd.org/
corruption/anti-bribery/Germany-Phase-4-Report-ENG.pdf.
113. GLI, Bribery & Corruption 2019 Germany, https://www.globallegalinsights.com
/practice-areas/bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regulations/germany.
114. GLI, Bribery & Corruption 2019 Italy, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/
practice-areas/bribery-andcorruption-laws-and-regulations/italy.
115. GLI, Bribery & Corruption 2019 Spain, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/
practice-areas/bribery-andcorruption-laws-and-regulations/spain.
116. GLI, Bribery & Corruption 2019 Netherlands, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/
practiceareas/bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regulations/netherlands/.
117. Dell & McDevitt, supra note 50.
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Chinese Enforcement
A recent prosecution of a Chinese company inside China under the
Anti-Unfair Competition Law for corruption is illustrated by the following
case.118
In November 2017, NT Medical Information Consultant (Shanghai) Co.
Ltd. was found liable for commercial bribery in the form of the payment of
conference fees, promotion fees, and similar fees to relevant departments and
persons in hospitals, for the purpose of promoting sales.119
Foreign companies operating in China will also be prosecuted.
In the summer of 2013, GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”), a British
pharmaceutical company listed on both the London and New York stock
exchanges, became the focus of the biggest corruption scandal in China
involving a foreign company. The GSK chain was accused of bribing
doctors in order to promote GSK’s medical products. GSK was found to have
offered money or property to nongovernment personnel in order to obtain
improper commercial gains and was found guilty of bribing non-government
personnel. GSK was ordered to pay a fine of RMB 3bn (£297m) to the
Chinese government. Five former GSK senior executives were sentenced to
suspended imprisonment of two to three years.120
Under the CCP’s Judicial Commission,Supervisory commissions are
State anticorruption agencies. The National Supervisory Commission is the
highest State supervisory organ, and all provincial, city and county-level
regions have their own supervisory commissions…. [A]bout 33,000 people
in 28,000 cases were convicted of taking bribes or dereliction of duty last

118. Todd Liao & Judy Wang, China Announces Crackdown Campaign Against Unfair
Competition Activities, JD SUPRA, June 27, 2018, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/chinaannounces-crackdown-campaign-35601/.
119. The payments were made by pharmaceutical representatives to doctors and other
individuals at the hospitals in the form of a rebate, which was directly based upon the volume
of sales at those hospitals. Investigators from the Shanghai Administrative Bureau of Industry
and Commerce concluded that these unreported rebates to hospital personnel were made in
exchange for business opportunities and sales promotion, and that they constituted
commercial bribery under the PRC Anti-Unfair Competition Law. The company’s illegal
profits were confiscated, and the company was fined 180,000 renminbi ($27,381). Todd Liao
& Judy Wang, China Announces Crackdown Campaign Against Unfair Competition
Activities, JD SUPRA, June 27, 2018, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/china-announcescrackdown-campaign-35601/.
120. GLI, Bribery & Corruption 2019 China, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/
practice-areas/bribery-andcorruption-laws-and-regulations/china.
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year, Chief Justice Zhou Qiang said in the [2018] work report of the Supreme
People’s Court.121
FCPA of U.S.
The FCPA122 is a formidable presence in the fight against international
corruption. With this law, the U.S. uses anticorruption laws and sanctions to
police the world! 123 It does not matter that there were no American citizens
involved – since 1977, the FCPA has allowed the US to become the
anticorruption policeman for the whole world.”124
121. Zhang Yan, Pressure Still High On Graft During Supervision Reform, China Daily,
Mar. 13, 2019, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201903/13/WS5c88005ea3106c65c34ee3ea.
html. See also Jamie P. Horsley, What’s So Controversial About China’s New AntiCorruption Body?, DIPLOMAT, May 30, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/whatssocontroversial-about-chinas-new-anti-corruption-body/. (“The Commission is co-located
with and has integrated its anti-corruption functions with the CCP’s own powerful anti-graft
body, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI)…. But the Law fails to
subject anti-corruption work to the due process requirements of China’s criminal justice and
administrative law systems. Instead, its stipulations appear to be enforceable only by the state
supervisors it purports to regulate and by the CCDI.”).
122. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq., available
at https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act. The top ten FCPA
settlements: 1. Petrobras (Brazil) - $1.78 billion in 2018; 2. Telia Company (Sweden) - $965
million in 2017; 3. Siemens (Germany) - $800 million in 2008; 4. VimpelCom (Netherlands)
- $795 million in 2016; 5. Alstom (France) - $772 million in 2014; 6. Société Générale
(France) - $585 million in 2018; 7. Halliburton (US) - $579 million in 2009; 8. Teva
Pharmaceutical(Israel) - $519 million in 2016; 9. Keppel Offshore & Marine (Singapore) $422 million in 2017; 10. Och-Ziff (US) - $412 million in 2016. Petrobras agrees to biggest
FCPA settlement, BIZBLOG, https://www.lexisnexis.com/communities/lexisnexis_biz/b/biz
blog/archive/2018/10/05/a-new-no-1-petrobrasagrees-to-biggest-fcpa-settlement.aspx. See
also FCPA Digest 2019 – Recent Trends and Patterns in the Enforcement of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, https://www.shearman.com/perspectives/2019/01/shearman-fcpa-di
gest-2019and-recent-trends-and-patterns-in-fcpa. (“The DOJ entered into its first coordinated
resolution with authorities in a foreign bribery case, possibly heralding the emergence of
France as an important global anticorruption authority.”). Id. at 5.
123. Finbarr Bermingham, Explained: How the US Uses Anticorruption Laws and
Sanctions to Police the World, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 8, 2018), https://www.
scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2176998/explained-how-us-uses-anticorruptionlaws-andsanctions-police. (“There are a lot of instances where the total conduct has taken
place outside the US, by non-US persons. It’s a non-US company and non-US government
officials, going about their business outside the US. But if any of the money transited through
the US, if there was a bank account that was draw on there, or if a server based in the US was
used to send an email, there is jurisdiction,” quoting Wendy Wysong, who leads the AsiaPacific anticorruption and trade controls practice at law firm Clifford Chance).
124. Id. The cases of Patrick Ho and Sabrina Meng Wanzhou show the extraterritorial
reach of US authorities. Conviction of former Hong Kong minister Patrick Ho in a New York
court and the detention of Huawei’s chief financial officer, Sabrina Meng Wanzhou, in
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Enforcement of the law has been vigorous and consistent
In 2018, the DOJ and SEC resolved seventeen corporate enforcement
actions. Consistent with the trends and patterns over the past years, the DOJ
apparently deferred to the SEC to bring civil enforcement cases in the less
egregious matters, which has resulted in the SEC bringing eight enforcement
actions without parallel DOJ actions and typically with lower penalty
amounts.… Of the FCPA enforcement actions against individuals, 2018 has
seen twenty-one individuals charged by the DOJ (or had charges unsealed),
while the SEC brought cases against only four individuals.125
The FCPA operates at a globally efficient level of enforcement with
successful results.126 With a strong administrative agency and civil and
criminal penalties127 aimed to deter corruption, it is a welcome ally to other
countries ’anticorruption fights.
Its reach is further expanded by the U.S. incorporating it as a provision
in its FTAs.128
Canada have demonstrated the global reach of United States law enforcement. Ho was
convicted for money laundering and bribery, pertaining to oil rights in Chad and Uganda, on
behalf of CEFC China Energy under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), a US law
aimed at combating bribery of foreign officials. Huawei CFO ‘committed fraud to skirt Iran
sanctions.
125. FCPA Digest January 2019: Enforcement Actions and Strategies, SHEARMAN AND
STERLING at 5 https://fcpa.shearman.com/siteFiles/FCPA%20Headlines/fcpa-recenttrends
.pdf. See also Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1 at 26 (The “recent Petrobras case shows another
route to enforcement, with international investors seeking redress under US civil law.
Hundreds of holders of Petrobras stock have begun to file ‘derivative suits’ through which
shareholders can sue a company’s directors and officers for breaching their fiduciary duties
to that company.”).
126. The top ten FCPA settlements: 1. Petrobras (Brazil) - $1.78 billion in 2018; 2. Telia
Company (Sweden) - $965 million in 2017; 3. Siemens (Germany) - $800 million in 2008; 4.
VimpelCom (Netherlands) - $795 million in 2016; 5. Alstom (France) - $772 million in 2014;
6. Société Générale (France) - $585 million in 2018; 7. Halliburton (US) - $579 million in
2009; 8. Teva Pharmaceutical (Israel) - $519 million in 2016; 9. Keppel Offshore & Marine
(Singapore) - $422 million in 2017; 10. Och-Ziff (US) - $412 million in 2016. Lisa
Thompson, Petrobras agrees to biggest FCPA settlement, BIZBLOG, Oct. 5, 2018, https://
www.lexisnexis.com/communities/lexisnexis_biz/b/bizblog/archive/2018/10/05/a-newno-1petrobras-agrees-to-biggest-fcpa-settlement.aspx.
127. IDENTIFY FCPA FOREIGN CORRUPTION ANTI-BRIBERY RISKS AND PREVENT
VIOLATIONS, https://www.visualofac.com/regulations/fcpa-violations-penalties/. See also
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT, (2012), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf.
128. “It is U.S. Government policy to promote good governance, including host countries’
implementation and enforcement of anti-corruption laws and policies pursuant to their
obligations under international agreements. Since enactment of the FCPA, the United States
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The China Initiative, a 2018 DOJ-wide initiative, focuses on
“identifying and prosecuting Chinese economic espionage” in the U.S. and
will focus mostly on trade and intellectual property, with one of its goals to
“identify Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases involving Chinese
companies that compete with American businesses.”129
Interestingly, foreign investors in China can also find themselves within
the reach of U.S. law, under the FCPA.
Morgan Stanley’s real estate and fund advisory managing director,
Garth Peterson, colluded with a former chairman of a Chinese state-owned
enterprise, Yongye Enterprise Group. Peterson paid the Chinese official and
himself “finder’s fees” of $1.8 million that Morgan Stanley owed to third
parties. In exchange for the fees and personal interest in Morgan Stanley’s
investments, the Chinese official brought business to Morgan Stanley.130
Anticorruption Provisions in FTAs
Bilateral and regional trade agreements have come to supplement the
WTO’s good governance provisions and incorporated explicit anticorruption
and transparency provisions into their agreements.
The RTAs have grown over time both in absolute numbers … and in
depth, particularly among the EU’s trade partners…. Over the last two
decades it has become common for a number of states to enshrine the
principle of transparency in the preambles to their bilateral and regional
trade. … Furthermore, certain trade agreements have begun to include a
has been instrumental to the expansion of the international framework to fight corruption.
Several significant components of this framework are the Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions negotiated under the
auspices of the OECD (Antibribery Convention), the United Nations Convention against
Corruption (UN Convention), the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (OAS
Convention), the Council of Europe Criminal and Civil Law Conventions, and a growing list
of U.S. free trade agreements.” EXPORT.GOV, https://www.export.gov/article?id=Corruption.
“While it is U.S. Government policy to include anticorruption provisions in free trade
agreements (FTAs) that it negotiates with its trading partners, the anticorruption provisions
have evolved over time. The most recent FTAs negotiated now require trading partners to
criminalize ‘active bribery’ of public officials (offering bribes to any public official must be
made a criminal offense, both domestically and trans-nationally) as well as domestic ‘passive
bribery’ (solicitation of a bribe by a domestic official). All U.S. FTAs may be found at the
U.S. Trade Representative Website: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements.”
129. FCPA Digest January 2019: Enforcement Actions and Strategies, supra note 125, at
5. For a comprehensive review of cases, see FCPA Digest 28, https://fcpa.shearman.
com/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIjd-V46v93wIVqh6tBh3yhAT7EAMYAiAAEgIV5fD.
130. Jenkins, Chu, & Meadors, supra note 59.
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‘horizontal ’chapter on transparency which extends transparency obligations
to all policy areas of the trade agreement in question.131
The practicality of BITs in anticorruption fights is debatable; as the
legality usually turns on local anticorruption laws as opposed to
anticorruption provisions in the BIT.132 Some argue investment treaty
arbitration outside the local legal institutions can be useful in resolving these
disputes; but even this approach can be complicated. BITs from the Selected
EU members and China contain no transparency or anticorruption
language.133
The usual setting within which investment arbitration is taking place is
that of an investor bringing a claim against a host state, e.g. for compensation
for loss of investment. By invoking the so-called corruption defense,
however, the table turns, and it is the host state bringing a counterclaim
against the investor by invoking acts of corruption, e.g. bribery, as a means
to preclude any claims an investor might make and evade every liability. The
raison d’être of the corruption defense is that while arbitral tribunals are not
tasked with punishing acts of corruption, they clearly ‘cannot grant
assistance to a party that has engaged in a corrupt act.134’

131. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 16-18. (“For instance, it has become standard
practice for US trade agreements to include specific anti-corruption and anti-bribery
commitments into cross-cutting transparency chapters. At least until very recently US
anticorruption in international trade was similarly enhanced by the increased implementation
of the FCPA and the inclusion of references in its texts to anti-bribery laws.”).
132. Angelos Dimopoulos, ANTI‐CORRUPTION ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 2 (OCT. 4, 2015) http://www.law.kobeu.ac.jp/STP/GMAPs/ppt/0_4_1_Angelos.pdf. See
also, Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1. See also Yu-Ting Ye, Toward a Balanced and Liberal
Chinese Bilateral Treaty Regime in the Context of One Belt One Road, 41 HOUSTON INT’L J.
107 (2018); Jason Yackee, Investment Treaties and Investor Corruption: An Emerging
Defense for Host States?, (Oct. 19, 2012), INT’L INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/10/19/investment-treaties-and-investor-corruption-an-emergin
g-defense-for-hoststates/.
133. BITs are available at UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub, https://investmentpolicy
hubold.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu. See also Yu-Ting Ye, supra note 133.
(“While it may be tempting to harness the power of investment arbitration in the international
fight against corruption, investment tribunals are ill-suited to hear allegations of corruption.
The in pari delicto rule may encourage rather than discourage bribery, and investment
arbitration tribunals fail to take into account the purpose of bribes. Undoubtedly, the
international anti-corruption campaign should continue through other domestic and
international means, but investment arbitration is a poor forum for the airing of allegations of
corruption.”). See also Leo O’Toole, Investment Arbitration: A Poor Forum for the
International Fight Against Corruption, https://www.yjil.yale.edu/investmentarbitration-apoor-forum-for-the-international-fight-against-corruption/.
134. Mbiyavanga, supra note 40. See also Reeder, supra note 44.
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European Union135
In a Report for the Committee on International Trade of the European
Parliament, “evidence showed that international trade agreements have the
potential to act as the exogenous factor breaking the vicious circle of
corruption in economies based on privileged connections rather than fair
competition.”136 The Report argues further,
The options offered are between an ‘economist’s approach ’
with an apparently more modest but effective good governance
package, a ‘lawyer’s ’approach ’with firm anticorruption language
but unenforceable provisions even in EU countries (on bribery, for
instance), and a ‘holistic ’approach where the EU would
coordinate across international trade, promotion of norms and
development aid to have a strong and consistent approach
demanding good governance as part of its foreign and
development policy.137

135. EU’s promise of fighting corruption is “gradually being translated into action with
new anticorruption provisions foreseen in the coming updated EU Mexico Global Agreement
and recently launched EU Chile Association Agreement upgrade. The EU’s trade agreements
add to the WTO’s baseline on procurements and customs through dedicated chapters which
reinforce transparency provisions and electronic handling of public tenders and customs
paperwork, for example. Recent EU trade agreements also include general transparency
provisions in domestic regulation, namely for services. The chapter on investment protection
in CETA, the trade agreement with Canada, stipulates that foreign investors that have paid
bribes to obtain contracts will be excluded from the protection offered by the investment court
foreseen in the treaty.” Iana Dreyer, FTAs: How the EU Is Approaching the Fight Against
Corruption, BORDERLEX, (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.borderlex.eu/2018/01/24/ftas-howthe-eu-is-approaching-the-fight-against-corruption/.
136. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 5.
137. Id.
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Illustrative provisions from EU FTAs, such as in the Canada-EU Trade
Agreement (CETA), are as follows.138
Art 27.1 “Each Party shall ensure that its laws, regulations, procedures
and administrative rulings of general application respecting any matter
covered by this Agreement are promptly published or made available in such
a manner as to enable interested persons and the other Party to become
acquainted with them.”
Art. 27.4 “Each Party shall establish or maintain judicial, quasi-judicial
or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose of the prompt
review and, if warranted, correction of final administrative actions regarding
matters covered by this Agreement. Each Party shall ensure that its tribunals
are impartial and independent of the office or authority entrusted with
administrative enforcement and that they do not have any substantial interest
in the outcome of the matter.”
The question is whether the anticorruption provisions will be drafted to
successfully allow them within the scope of the dispute resolution
procedures, either directly or by their affecting other FTA provisions.139
Model language has been proposed.140
138. Free Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, Chapter 27, 2016 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-bychapter/. Free Trade Agreement, EU-Japan, Chapter 17, 2018,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1684.
139. Article 18.18 provides for the scope. “1. Without prejudice to the rights and
obligations of the Parties under Chapter Twenty-Nine (Dispute Settlement), an investor of a
Party may submit to the Tribunal constituted under this Section a claim that the other Party
has breached an obligation under: Section C, with respect to the expansion, conduct,
operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and sale or disposal of its covered
investment, or Section D, where the investor claims to have suffered loss or damage as a result
of the alleged breach.” Article 8.18.3 further provides: “Investors’ are precluded from
submitting claims for the resolution of investment disputes when such investment is made
corruptly or by other unlawful action.” There also is an obligation of governments to conduct
procurement procedures in a manner that will prevent corrupt practices (Article 19.4(4c)).
140. Scope of FTA’s dispute mechanism on corruption: “Increasingly, investment treaties
explicitly include references to corruption. Examples include … CETA. The proposed article
builds on the UN and OECD conventions on bribery but closes a loophole that allows
payments to be made to a family member or business associate instead of directly to a
politician or senior official. Implementation of the article from most enforcement and penal
perspectives is through domestic law. However, by including this clause, a breach is also a
breach of the treaty. Proposed [Model] Language [emphasis added] 1. Investors and their
investments shall not, prior to the establishment of an Investment or afterwards, offer, promise
or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries,
to a public official of the Host State, or a member of an official’s family or business associate
or other person in close proximity to an official, for that official or for a third party, in order
that the official or third party act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of
official duties, in order to achieve any favour in relation to a proposed Investment or any
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Another more recent trade agreement between the EU and Vietnam
(EUVIPA) incorporates an investment court system with a tribunal and an
appellate tribunal.141 The conciliation and mediation mechanisms under
CETA and EUVIPA use a more flexible evidentiary process aiming to
provide a fair and independent system. EUVIPA provides for detailed rules
concerning mediation with a mandatory six-month cooling period before a
claim can be submitted for arbitration. During which the parties consult,
followed by mediation or conciliation. A party can submit a notice of
arbitration only upon expiration of the cooling period.142 Article 14 provides
for transparency.143
China
Illustrative provisions from China FTAs, such as in the China-New
Zealand Agreement, are as follows.144
Art 194.3 “The final report of the arbitral tribunal shall be made
available as a public document after the lapse of 10 days from the date of its
release.”
Art.168 “Each Party shall ensure that its laws, regulations, procedures
and administrative rulings of general application respecting any matter
covered by this Agreement are promptly published or made available in such

licences, permits, contracts or other rights in relation to an Investment. 2. Investors and their
investments shall not be complicit in any act described in paragraph 1, including incitement,
aiding and abetting, and conspiracy to commit or authorization of such acts.” NATHALIE
BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER ET AL., HARNESSING INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 10 (2018) https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/meterial/harnessing-invest
ment-sustainabledevelopment.pdf.
141. EU-Vietnam trade and investment agreements, Art. 15, Free Trade Agreement Text,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437. See also EU-Vietnam Free Trade
Agreement: Joint Press Statement by Commissioner Malmström and Minister Tran Tuan Anh,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2041. See also Shilpa Singh J., Analyzing
Features of Investment Court System under CETA and EUVIPA: Discussing Improvement in
the System and Clarity to Clauses, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Feb. 8, 2019) http://
arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/02/08/analyzingfeatures-of-investment-court-sy
stem-under-ceta-and-euvipa-discussing-improvement-in-the-system-and-clarity-toclauses/.
142. Singh, supra note 141.
143. Free Trade Agreement, EU-Viet., Art. 14, Sept. 24, 2018, http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437.
144. Analysis from the following China FTAs: Free Trade Agreement, China-N.Z.,
Chapter 13, 2008, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agree
ments-in-force/china-fta/nz-china-fta-resources.
Free Trade Agreement, China-Austl., Chapter 13, 2015, https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agree
ments/in-force/chafta/official-documents/Pages/official-documents.aspx.
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a manner as to enable interested persons and the other Party to become
acquainted with them.”
Art. 170 “Each Party shall, where warranted, establish or maintain
judicial, quasijudicial or administrative tribunals, or procedures for the
purpose of the prompt review and correction of final administrative actions
regarding matters covered by this Agreement, other than those taken for
prudential reasons. Such tribunals shall be impartial and independent of the
office or authority entrusted with administrative enforcement and shall not
have any substantial interest in the outcome of the matter.”
From the China-South Korea FTA.145
Article 4.5: Transparency 1. Each Party shall ensure that its customs
and other trade-related laws, regulations, general administrative procedures
and other requirements, including fees and charges, are readily available to
all interested parties, via an officially designated medium including official
website. Each customs authority shall publish146 all customs laws and any
administrative procedures it applies or enforces, via an officially designated
medium including official website.
In summary, both EU and China provide in their FTAs for publishing
relevant laws and regulations.
Other FTAs
United States
Illustrative provisions from U.S. FTAs, such as in the CAFTA-DR
Agreement, are as follows.147 CAFTA-DR examples:

145. Free Trade Agreement, China-S. Kor., Art. 4.5, June 1, 2015, http://fta.mofcom.gov.
cn/korea/annex/xdzw_en.pdf.
146. See also Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., Art. 20.14, July 14, 2004, https://
ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/australian-fta/final-text. (“The panel shall
present a final report to the disputing Parties, including any separate opinions on matters not
unanimously agreed, within 30 days of presentation of the initial report, unless the disputing
Parties otherwise agree. The disputing Parties shall release the final report to the public within
15 days thereafter, subject to the protection of confidential information.”).
147. Analysis from the following FTAs: Free Trade Agreement, CAFTA-DR, Chapter 18,
2004, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republiccentral-america-fta/final-text. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., Chapter 20, 2004, https://
ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/australian-fta/final-text. See also Lance
Compa, Jeffrey Vogt, and Eric Gottwald, Wrong Turn for Workers’ Rights: The U.S.Guatemala CAFTA Labor Arbitration Ruling – And What To Do About It, INTERNATIONAL
LABOR RIGHTS FORUM (Apr. 12, 2018), https://laborrights.org/publications/wrong-turn-work
ers%E2%80%99-rights-us-guatemala-cafta-labor-arbitration-ruling-%E2%80%93-and-wha
t-do (discussing inherent issues and obstacles in enforcement).
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Art 18.2 Publish laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative
rulings of general application respecting any matter covered by the
Agreement.
Art 18.5 Maintain independent and impartial judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose of the prompt review
and, where warranted, correction of final administrative actions regarding
matters covered by this Agreement.
Anti-Corruption Measures: Art 18.8: 1. Each Party shall adopt or
maintain the necessary legislative or other measures to establish that bribery
is a criminal offense in matters affecting international trade or investment;
and 2. Adopt or maintain appropriate penalties and procedures to enforce the
criminal measures that it adopts.
About the recently negotiated but not yet ratified USMCA FTA,148 it
has been observed,149
Chapter 27 of the USMCA’s anticorruption measures can be
divided into three categories, namely: (1) legislative measures—
i.e., laws or other legislative measures to criminalize bribery; (2)
administrative measures—i.e., measures that the countries may
undertake through executive-branch regulation or similar action,
rather than new legislation; and (3) promotional measures—i.e.,
measures that are less concrete and harder to quantify, but call for
the three countries to promote and encourage awareness and the
adoption of certain anticorruption practices while requiring no real
specific action. Chapter 27 explicitly permits the parties to initiate
claims through the USMCA’s dispute settlement mechanism to
challenge measures alleged to be inconsistent with the Chapter’s
requirements.
CPTPP

148. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 2018, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/
free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreementbetween.
149. Collmann Griffin, Richard Mojica, & Marc Alain Bohn, Takeaways from the AntiCorruption Chapter of the USMCA, FCPA BLOG, (Jan. 9, 2019), http://www.fcpablog.
com/blog/2019/1/9/takeaways-from-the-anti-corruption-chapter-of-the-usmca.html. (“To be
sure, there are clear limitations on the applicability of the dispute settlement mechanism to
Chapter 27’s anticorruption provisions. Most notably, the signatories have explicitly excluded
disputes arising out of parties’ failure to effectively enforce laws adopted or maintained
pursuant to the agreement, likely due to sovereignty concerns. In addition, because the
USMCA is ultimately a trade agreement, the dispute resolution mechanism only covers
measures that affect trade or investment between the parties.”).
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The recent recently completed CPTPP FTA has illustrative
provisions.150
Art 26.2. Publish laws, regulations, procedures and administrative
rulings of general application with respect to any matter covered by this
Agreement : Art 26.7 Anti-Corruption measures should be maintained by
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal
offences under its law, in matters that affect international trade or investment
and make violators liable for sanctions.
Enforcement Mechanisms
China and the EU take a similar approach to the enforcement of the
transparency provision in their FTAs. First off, claims under the
transparency chapters can access the full dispute resolution options included
in the agreement;151 this is unlike the labor and environmental chapters which
have no access to binding arbitration in EU and China FTAs.152 If a binding
arbitration is requested, the parties are responsible for implementing the
arbitration decision, and there are penalties for failing to comply with the
arbitration ruling.153 The EU and China slightly differ in the steps that must
be taken before a party “suspended obligations” of the trade agreement on
all or some of the other parties ’benefits. China requires parties to first
negotiate on compensation to resolve the noncompliance before suspending
obligations154, while the EU gives the parties the option to either negotiate
compensation or suspend obligations.155 Similarly, the U.S. and CPTPP
enables a party to “suspend benefits” if the other party fails to implement an

150. Analysis from the following: CPTPP, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
for Trans-Pacific Partnership, https://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreementsaccords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/texttexte/index.aspx?lang=eng. Agreement Analysis
by New Zealand, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/CPTPP/Comprehensive-and-Progressive-Agreement-forTra
ns-Pacific-Partnership-CPTPP-National-Interest-Analysis.pdf.
151. Failure to comply with transparency requirements can go to binding arbitration
pursuant to CETA, Article 29.10.
152. See Ronald C. Brown, FTAs in Asia-Pacific: ‘Next Generation’ of Social Dimension
Provisions on Labor? 26 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 69 (2016) at 2.
153. See Free Trade Agreement, China-N.Z., Art. 195, 2008, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/
topic/ennewzealand.shtml. See also CETA, Can.-EU, Art, 29.12, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/
trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/.
154. See Free Trade Agreement, China-N.Z., Art. 198, 2008, http://fta.mof com.gov.cn/
topic/ennewzealand.shtml.
155. See CETA, Can.-EU, Art, 29.14, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/
ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/.
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arbitration ruling after attempting to negotiate compensation.156 These
remedies are only available to Government Parties.
Third-party investors have a different set of dispute resolution remedies
that are governed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.157 All parties have
ratified the “Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards”158 and are obligated to enforce foreign arbitration
156. See Free Trade Agreement, CAFTA-DR, Art. 20.16, 2004, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republiccentral-america-fta/final-text.
See also Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Art 28.20,
2018, https://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ag
racc/cptpp-ptpgp/text-texte/index.aspx?lang=eng.
157. See Art 8.41 CETA and Art 153 China-New Zealand FTA. See generally Julissa
Reynoso, Michael A. Fernández, Ariel Flint, & Erin Baldwin, The Corruption Defense:
Practical Considerations for Claimants, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Jan. 22, 2019),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/01/22/the-corruption-defense-practical-co
nsiderations-forclaimants/. See also Reeder, supra note 44.
158. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“The
New York Convention”), June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; available at https://www.uncitral.
org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/New-York-Convention-E.pdf. See also Thomas G.
Allen, Andrew Van Duzer, & Daniel E. Parga, China Aims to Modernize Its Arbitration and
Award Enforcement Regime, GREENBERGTRAURIG (Sept. 2018), https://www.gtlaw.com/
en/insights/2018/9/china-aims-to-modernize-its-arbitration-and-award-enforcement-regime.
(“China’s reputation for enforcing foreign arbitration awards remains mixed, and there are
examples of the process taking many years,” but reforms of arbitration were announced on
Sept. 7, 2018 by China’s Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in its fiveyear legislative plan “to study and potentially move forward with revisions to China’s
arbitration law (Arbitration Law) and the implementation of a new civil enforcement law.”).
Part of the problem for foreign parties in the enforcement of arbitration agreements in China
arises when a foreign party is registered in China as a WFOE, because the Chinese then
consider it a Chinese party and resorts to domestic law, not foreign treaty law for the
enforcement. For discussion on reforms seeking to further align Chinese arbitration with
international practices, with “a signal to the international arbitration community about China’s
commitment to evolve into an arbitration-friendly environment,” see Jingzhou Tao and
Mariana Zhong, China’s 2017 Reform of Its Arbitration-Related Court Review Mechanism
with a Focus on Improving Chinese Courts’ Prior-Reporting System, 35 J. OF INT’L ARB. Issue
3, 371–378 (2018). Also, there are signs of liberalizing that definition in cases arising from a
Chinese free trade zone, where a foreign party, even though a WFOE, may still be considered
as a “foreign party. See also Tereza Gao and Edison Li, China Cases Insight No. 5: Through
Siemens v. Golden Landmark, China Reforms Arbitration for Free Trade Zones in Order to
Prepare for “Belt & Road”, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT (June
29, 2018), https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/commentaries/clc-1-201806insights-5-gao-li/ (“In
January 2017, the SPC issued the Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Provision
of Judicial Safeguards for the Construction of Pilot Free Trade Zones, (the “2017 Opinions”),
Paragraph 9 of which provides: where wholly foreign-owned enterprises registered in pilot
free trade zones mutually agree to submit a commercial dispute to arbitration outside the
territory [of China], [a people’s court] should not determine that the related arbitration
agreement is invalid merely on the grounds that the [enterprises’] dispute does not have
foreign related elements.”).
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awards.159 Additionally, third-party investors must have “clean hands,” to
avoid corrupt investors using the dispute resolution mechanisms to evade
liabilities.160 Many EU countries have in the past
negotiated agreements which include a mechanism for resolving
disputes between governments and investors known as investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS).161 CETA replaces this with a new and better Investment
Court System (ICS). CETA contains an Investment Court,162 which has been
confirmed to be compatible with EU treaties.163
159. See Mo Zhang, Enforceability: Foreign Arbitral Awards in Chinese Courts, 20 SAN
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1 (2018), https://digital.sandiego.edu/ilj/vol20/iss1/2/ (for information on
enforcement of arbitration awards in China).
160. Article 8 of CETA stipulates if corruption affects an investment, access to investment
court is precluded. Can.-EU Trade Agreement (CETA), Chapter 8, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/
policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/. See also Mbiyavanga, supra note 40. (“The
usual setting within which investment arbitration is taking place is that of an investor bringing
a claim against a host state, e.g. for compensation for loss of investment. By invoking the socalled corruption defense, however, the table turns, and it is the host state bringing a
counterclaim against the investor by invoking acts of corruption, e.g. bribery, as a means to
preclude any claims an investor might make and evade every liability. The raison d’être of
the corruption defense is that while arbitral tribunals are not tasked with punishing acts of
corruption, they clearly ‘cannot grant assistance to a party that has engaged in a corrupt act.”)
While Article 8.41(4) goes back to the home country for enforcement of the arbitration, since
all parties have ratified UNCITRAL it is essential they comply regardless if it is country with
a weak rule of law. Additionally, if a government party fails to comply with an investor then
the other government party can step in and suspend benefits. See CETA, EU-Can., Art, 29.12,
2017. See also provisions in the UNCITRAL model rules of arbitration addressing corrupt
public procurement, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session2/V0
850164e.pdf.
161. CETA Explained, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/
ceta/ceta-explained/index_en.htm#read-more.
162. Investment provisions within Free Trade Agreement, EU-Can. (CETA), http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf. (“CETA creates a permanent
investment Tribunal and an Appellate Tribunal. Contrary to the traditional investment dispute
settlement approach, the Tribunal will be composed of fifteen members nominated by the
Union and Canada and not by arbitrators nominated by the investor and the defending state.
The tribunal will hear cases in divisions of three members appointed via a randomized
procedure. The Appellate Tribunal will review decisions of the Tribunal. CETA clearly
defines the grounds for reviewing awards of the Tribunal. The Members of the Tribunal and
Appellate Tribunal will have the same qualifications as for the International Court of Justice
and will have to be beyond reproach in terms of ethics. The Union and Canada will adopt a
decision setting out the practical details, already identified in CETA. In addition, CETA
contains a firm commitment that the Union and Canada will join efforts with other interested
parties for the creation of an international multilateral investment court.”).
163. Guillaume Croisant, Opinion 1/17 – The CJEU Confirms that CETA’s Investment
Court System is Compatible with EU Law, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Apr. 30, 2019),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/04/30/opinion-117the-cjeu-confirms-thatcetas-investment-court-system-is-compatible-with-eu-law/. (“The Court of Justice of the
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IV. Analysis
The Problem
[R]esearchers have found evidence for negative effects of
corruption on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the hypothesis
that corruption deters foreign investment by acting as an extra
tax.164
Transparency International’s new report, Exporting
Corruption, finds that only 11 major exporting countries—
accounting for about a third of world exports—have active or
moderate law enforcement against companies bribing abroad in
order to gain mining rights, contracts for major construction
projects, purchases of planes and other deals.165
China, as one of the world’s largest exporters and foreign direct
investors, especially under its BRI global economic development plan is
identified as a state failing to enforce anticorruption and transparency
standards.166 Likewise, EU states ’enforcement of anticorruption laws is not
consistent among themselves.167
To date, the current approach of international and national monitoring
mechanisms, laws, and sanctions used as enforcement means are largely
ineffective to end corruption in trade. Likewise, relying on peer-review
evaluations that lack meaningful sanctions mechanism does not appear to be

European Union (“CJEU”) confirmed the compatibility with EU law of the Investment Court
System (“ICS”) provided for by the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between
the EU and Canada (“CETA”).”).
164. Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella, The New Economics of Corruption: A Survey and
Some New Results, 45 POLITICAL STUDIES 496 (1997), http://www.people.hbs.edu/rditella/
papers/pscorrsurvey.pdf, cited in, Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1.
165. Foreign Bribery Rages Unchecked in Over Half of Global Trade, TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL (2018) https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/exporting-corruption2018. Country by country, the report names the top offenders as well as the flaws in national
legal systems that allow these crimes to continue unchecked.
166. Dell, supra note 58.
167. Anti-Corruption Report, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/
what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report.
(“The report showed that the nature and scope of corruption varies from one Member State to
another and that the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies is quite different. It also showed
how corruption is a phenomenon affecting all Member States, and how continued action is
needed across the EU.”).
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ending corruption. The European Commission too has seldom exercised
sanctions for corruption against member states.168
Regional trade agreements are enforced through both bilateral investorstate dispute settlements and bilateral Government-government dispute
settlements. What happens, however, if a country lacks the proper
institutions for the desired implementation of remedies for violations; for
instance, judicial independence and rule of law generally? It is argued that
“newly included references to anticorruption conventions are good news
only as far as the simple ratification of those conventions goes, for such
conventions can have almost no effect, particularly in countries with high
corruption.”169
Alternative Approaches
How to curb corruption in international trade and investment is
certainly as formidable a task as religion’s efforts to eliminate sin. Scholars
of the highest order have identified, explained, and proposed many
approaches to end it, but the fight goes on to harness the most effective
solutions.170 Professor Mungiu-Pippidi laid out the challenge: “What
synergies could be developed across the board to enhance the impact across
trade and anticorruption policies? How have the international conventions
and the anticorruption legal regime performed so far, and what kind of
provisions in the international trade agreement could help them, or be helped
by them?”171
Within the perimeters of this paper, focused on EU and China FTA
provisions, what practical alternatives can be proposed for their mutual
benefit with the goal of fighting corruption? Some basic observations are
identified below:
International bribery and corruption are endemic. International
standards and conventions produce inconsistent prosecution results at the
state level. While the EU and its Members have had successes in prosecuting
corruption under state law, enforcement is still inconsistent across the entire
EU.172 China is negatively perceived on its role in corruption in international
168. See Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 26. A monitoring mechanism with collective
sanctions is included in the EU’s ‘trade for all’ strategy, but it was never implemented in the
Cotonou agreement (the only one country has ever been sanctioned).
169. Id. at 25.
170. See e.g., Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Seven Steps to Control of Corruption: The Road
Map, (2018) https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/daed_a_00500.
171. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 27.
172. Id. at 35. (“Today, the uneven implementation of the OECD antibribery convention
even across EU members, let alone the rest of the world raises the question of whether
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trade and investment and there is a paucity of evidence of successful
prosecutions under its laws.173
Therefore, what more can be done to effectively diminish the global
plague of corruption? Standards, conventions, laws, trade agreements all
appear to have their shortcomings. Is there an approach that can provide
enhanced enforcement and an umbrella of protection to all states and citizens
under it?
Recommended approaches in fighting corruption in international trade
have been suggested.174
Foremost is the necessity for a rule of law to exist in the country that
would prosecute the case.175 Without laws and their administrative and
judicial enforcement there is only an inert law. As mentioned, China has a
negative rating on endemic corruption, at least partly due to rule of law
emphasis on laws against bribery which cannot be enforced equally across parties actually
brings more equal treatment and market access, or less. In fact, uneven enforcement of laws
prohibiting foreign bribery puts companies that play by the rules while competing in a global
marketplace at a serious disadvantage.”).
173. Jonathan E. Hillman, Corruption Flows Along China’s Belt and Road, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/corru
ptionflows-along-chinas-belt-and-road (for example, comments include the following: “In
many of the 80-plus countries that the BRI aims to connect, corruption is endemic. … China
adopted a foreign bribery law in 2011 but has done little to enforce it. Chinese companies are
also among the least transparent according to a Transparency International study of 100
companies in 15 emerging markets.”).
174. See e.g., Dell & McDevitt, supra note 50. See also Dell, supra note 58. See also
Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1. Some argue that “[to] date, the most effective enforcement
mechanism we have seen in an anti-corruption treaty is the peer-review monitoring system
overseen by the OECD Working Group on Bribery,” the fact is China is not a member of the
OECD. Where: Global reach, OECD.ORG, https://www.oecd.org/about/members-andpartners/. For comments on the proposed terms for the USMCA, see Griffin, Mojica, & Bohn,
supra note 149. (“Although there are no penalties as a result of these periodic peer-review
assessments, the Working Group has proven to be a surprisingly powerful motivator for
OECD members, appearing to drive legislative and administrative reform among countries
simply through “naming and shaming.” Whether the USMCA dispute settlement will prove
as effective as the OECD Working Group will be an important anti-corruption development
to watch.”).
175. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1 (noting that there is a “close correlation between the
rule of law and control of corruption (at over 90 per cent in World Governance Indicators) so
clearly, wherever corruption is high the rule of law is also inadequate. How then can legal
approaches to anti-corruption be expected to work, or can the solution be the same as the
problem itself? Furthermore, change in control of corruption in countries with an anticorruption agency (ACA) but lacking the rule of law is on average marginally lower than in
those which introduced an ACA and attained a certain level of the rule of law. The reasons
are obvious, for regardless of how much emphasis the UNCAC and the international
anticorruption community place on ‘autonomous’ anticorruption agencies, they can hardly be
divorced from the context of the country.”).

3 - Brown_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete)

254

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

4/24/2020 2:05 PM

[Vol. 43:2

issues and lack of openness.176 Likewise, enforcement agencies, need
authority and the availability of the rule of law to enforce. Beyond that, over
the years, at the national level the following suggestions have been offered
for inclusion in FTA provisions seeking to limit corruption.
Establish open markets177
Have strong national laws
Develop the proper institutions to implement the law
Encourage due diligence by having it affect remedy. This can bring
prevention and avoidance of corporate liability and penalties; and of course,
save huge amounts of defense costs.178
Include whistleblower protections
Monitor foreign bribery settlements
Debar violators from state benefits and government-backed financing179
176. Hillman, supra note 173 (“A long list of Chinese companies has been debarred from
the World Bank and other multilateral development banks for fraud and corruption, which
covers everything from inflating costs to giving bribes. In many of the 80-plus countries that
the BRI aims to connect, corruption is endemic. Among participating economies, the median
credit rating is junk, so alternative lenders stay away. Chinese construction companies benefit
because—backed by state financing and often state ownership—they are willing to take risks
that others will not. They also know that, if the going gets tough, Beijing can intervene
politically on their behalf. Of course, Chinese companies are not alone in being accused of
peddling influence. But authorities in the United States and European Union are more vigilant
in policing their own companies abroad. China adopted a foreign bribery law in 2011 but has
done little to enforce it. Chinese companies are also among the least transparent according to
a Transparency International study of 100 companies in 15 emerging markets.”).
177. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 35 (“Establish as the main goal a trade treaty to
open markets. The evidence speaks for itself that the more a market is opened, the greater the
contribution to countering corruption, even if only in the long run. … [A] treaty which opens
nearly all public procurement areas to external competition and makes it entirely transparent
makes a far larger contribution than one which invokes criminal penalties which it cannot
enforce.”).
178. Jenkins, Chu, & Meadors, supra note 59. Due diligence can save companies much
money in lowered penalties. For example, it is reported, “Morgan Stanley because it had an
effective compliance program in place, conducted a thorough investigation when the matter
was discovered and fully cooperated with authorities. Morgan Stanley, because of its
proactive practices, has saved many millions of dollars in investigation costs, legal fees, and
potential fines and disgorgements. (In contrast, Wal-Mart disclosed that its FCPA
investigation costs had reached $230 million as of March of 2013, equating to approximately
$600,000 per day in professional fees, and continues to grow. The U.S. government hasn’t
yet assessed Wal-Mart penalties or fees.).”
179. Hillman, supra note 173 (“Certain experts argue that trade agreements should include
as standard provisions stipulating that countries may debar firms found guilty of corruption
from competing for public contracts in either the home or host country. That is the model as
practiced by the World Bank, for instance and found in treaties, for instance in the final
[CP]TPP text, which stated that countries ‘may include’ procedures which would render
ineligible for future contracts suppliers that have engaged in fraud.”). MungiuPippidi, supra
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Limit the use of corrupt party’s use of FTA dispute resolution
procedures180
Name and shame violators181
Require whistleblower provisions182
Make public, international organizations and state evaluations and
decisions regarding corruption, to the extent permissible by law183
States could work with and utilize the resources of FCPA, as was done
with France”184
note 1, at 23 (“By analogy, a long list of Chinese companies has been debarred from the World
Bank and other multilateral development banks for fraud and corruption, which covers
everything from inflating costs to giving bribes.”).
180. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 36 (“Disbarment of firms should be considered
when countries have no anti-bribery laws or do not implement them.”).
181. This approach is used by the OECD.
182. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 23-24, 36. A US trade deal with Korea incorporated
mandatory whistleblower protection measures, while other recent US trade agreements with
Colombia, with Peru and with Panama have introduced measures providing for non-criminal
sanctions for enterprises not subject to criminal penalties.
183. Id. (“GRECO and OECD evaluation reports are public by default, with UNCAC
reports available only case-by-case. The US now includes in all its trade agreements, GPA
equivalent measures such as a provision to ensure integrity in government procurement
practices. A US trade deal with Korea incorporated mandatory whistleblower protection
measures, while other recent US trade agreements with Colombia, with Peru and with Panama
have introduced measures providing for non-criminal sanctions for enterprises not subject to
criminal penalties.”).
184. Id. at 25. (“[T]he FPCA can be a formidable instrument and the recent practice of
seeking claims on behalf of other countries promises more cooperation in future.”). See also
2013 Mid-Year FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (July 8, 2013), https://www.gibsondunn.com/
2013-mid-year-fcpa-update/. (“On May 29, 2013, DOJ and the SEC announced a joint FCPA
settlement with French oil and gas company Total, S.A. In one of the largest combined
monetary resolutions in the statute’s history, Total, an ADR-issuer in the United States, agreed
to pay a $245.2 million fine to DOJ and to disgorge $153 million in profits to the SEC, for a
total payment of more than $398 million. Simultaneously, French anti-corruption authorities
announced that they are recommending that Total, a senior executive, and two Iranian
businessmen stand trial on related charges before a Paris criminal tribunal. DOJ’s press
release announcing the settlement that this case represents “the first coordinated action by
French and U.S. law enforcement in a major foreign bribery case” and evidences that the two
countries “are working more closely today than ever before to combat corporate corruption.”
But the DPA itself reveals some of the challenges of French-U.S. law enforcement
coordination, qualifying what is usually a boilerplate obligation to cooperate with U.S.
authorities’ post-settlement with notations that any such cooperation must be consistent with
French data protection, labor, and blocking statutes. … Total is contesting the French charges,
releasing a statement that “Total and [the senior executive] will argue that the behavior that
they are accused of was completely legal under French law. According to the U.S. settlements,
between 1995 and 2004, Total utilized intermediaries to make approximately $60 million in
improper payments to the Chairman of a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil
Company to obtain the rights to develop two significant oil and gas fields in Iran. Total
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On the international level, a variety of approaches can be considered.
Create a new international prosecution body. The OECD Convention
Against Corruption or UNCAC or GRECO could be expanded providing
resort to a newly created international body that would prosecute individual
cases after monitoring reveals an absence of national competency as
measured by Convention criteria. But will China be included?
Insert in the EU-China FTA a provision for agreement to the application
of a strong EU anticorruption enforcement law, such as that in the UK, and
similar to the practice of the U.S. to insert the FCPA.185
Having openness is perhaps the best and easiest approach to
diminishing corruption, not just in the procurement process, but in all the
government transactions, prosecutions for corruption, and contents of
corruption settlements and decisions. One way to do this is through
provisions in free trade agreements, bilateral or multilateral. In the case of
an EU-China FTA, the umbrella of the agreement would affect 29 countries.
V. Conclusion: Path for Enhanced Enforcement and
Umbrella Coverage of Anticorruption
An EU-China FTA can be a win-win proposition for each in that the
anticorruption provisions can bring a harmonization186 of obligations within
and between 29 states (EU’s 28 Members and China) regardless of the status
of their local laws; and, at the same time, given the proper dispute resolution
procedures, provide an alternative resolution through international
arbitration.187 For China, the win is to gain an international forum for
allegedly mischaracterized the unlawful payments as “business development expenses” paid
through what purported to be legitimate consulting agreements with the intermediaries.”)
185. All U.S. FTAs may be found at the U.S. Trade Representative Website: http://www.
ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements.
186. Griffin, Mojica, & Bohn, supra note 149. (Commenting on the proposed USMCA:
“Use Chapter 27 to help streamline compliance programs—If the USMCA goes into force,
the United States, Mexico, and Canada will be obliged to harmonize any domestic anticorruption laws and practices that are out of step with the agreement. This harmonization
should ideally help to establish a more uniform set of expectations from prosecutors and
regulators in the United States, Mexico, and Canada, allowing companies to streamline
policies and procedures that previously had to be tailored based on jurisdiction. In anticipation
of this harmonization, companies and compliance professionals in the region can use Chapter
27 to begin streamlining their compliance programs in each of these countries to meet the
anti-corruption standards set forth in the USMCA.”).
187. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 25. (“Many trade agreements like … the EUCanada CETA offer foreign traders and investors certain protections similar to those provided
by bilateral investment treaties. They allow investors to seek restitution outside the host state’s
judicial system, where that state has not complied with its treaty obligations subject to the
government-government dispute settlement (GGDS) mechanism. Transparency International
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resolving issues of corruption in international trade.188 However, if the
dispute resolution procedures are not crafted to largely avoid local
institutions and domestic rule of law issues (especially on enforcement),
FTA anticorruption, openness and good governance provisions will not
necessarily be effective. Some of these alternatives to strengthen the dispute
resolution provisions, which are the key to successful enforcement,
discussed above could be considered and incorporated in the FTA.189
The pathway to an EU-China FTA that has the potential to add an
additional legal tool for addressing the endemic plague of bribery and
corruption in international trade includes three steps.190
First, provide substantive transparency and anticorruption provisions in
the FTA.
Secondly, provide a broad procedural pathway to dispute resolution and
binding arbitration, anticipating rule of law enforcement issues in some
states.
Thirdly, authorize the dispute arbitrators with a panoply of remedies,
including to bar claimants use of the procedures if in their relevant
transactions they have engaged in corruption and bribery.191

(2017) highlights the necessity to implement RTAs at national level. A problem in local
enforcement could arise.”).
188. Note that China is not a member of the OECD or a signatory of its Anti-Corruption
Convention.
189. Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 1, at 25. See also Westbroek, supra note 82, at 3.
190. Analysis from the following China FTAs: Free Trade Agreement, China-N.Z.,
Chapter 13, 2008,
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/ennewzealand.shtml; Free Trade
Agreement, China-S. Kor., June 1, 2015, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/korea/annex/xdzw_en.pdf.
One can look to the EU’s CETA provisions and China’s provisions in its New Zealand or
South Korean FTAs. Also useful are the provisions in the CPTPP and the USMCA. MungiuPippidi, supra note 1, at 25. (“Regional trade agreements are enforced through both bilateral
Investor-state dispute settlements and bilateral Government-government dispute settlements.
Many trade agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), TPP and
the EU-Canada CETA offer foreign traders and investors certain protections similar to those
provided by bilateral investment treaties. They allow investors to seek restitution outside the
host state’s judicial system, where that state has not complied with its treaty obligations
subject to the government-government dispute settlement (GGDS) mechanism. Transparency
International (2017) highlights the necessity to implement RTAs at national level.”)
191. Foreign Bribery Rages Unchecked in Over Half of Global Trade, supra note 165.
(“A long list of Chinese companies has been debarred from the World Bank and other
multilateral development banks for fraud and corruption, which covers everything from
inflating costs to giving bribes.”).
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